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vSmall-scale irrigation farming is envisaged as playing a progressively larger role in rural development 
and in reducing some of the inequalities 
inherent in South Africa’s space economy. 
The promotion of entry by black farmers 
into commercialised small-scale irrigation 
farming appears to have been bolstered by 
the late 1990s convergence of agricultural, 
water, land, local government and other 
sector reforms. Concomitant to these reforms, 
the government’s macro-policy shifts seem 
to favour the creation of a black farming 
elite, and an important question centres on 
the possible negative impacts of neo-liberal 
policies on the livelihoods of the poorest 
and most vulnerable people within small-
scale irrigation farming communities. It is 
also debatable whether a new class of petty 
commodity producers can establish a viable 
niche within global commodity chains, 
given the significant constraints to effective 
participation in a highly competitive and 
globalised commodity production sector. 
Furthermore, there are questions over the 
impacts of recent attempts to facilitate entry 
by small-scale farmers into commercial 
production through joint ventures or ‘black 
economic empowerment’ (BEE) partnerships 
involving small-scale farmers, private 
investors and government. There is a need 
to examine the power dynamics within such 
joint venture schemes. The historical context 
of gender inequalities in access to and control 
over productive resources in communal 
settings and the observations that women’s 
roles and interests in land are increasingly 
politicised and contested indicate a need for 
a gender-sensitive examination of the impacts 
of commercialisation on the livelihoods 
of women and men living in emerging 
small-scale irrigation schemes. Such an 
examination is required not only within 
communal area settings, but also in the newly 
redistributed commercial farming areas.
This report is based on research carried 
out between June 2003 and April 2005 in the 
Greater Sekhukhune Cross-Border District 
Foreword
Municipality, which straddles the boundaries 
of the Mpumalanga and Limpopo provinces. 
This research took place in two case-study 
sites, namely the Hereford and the Phetwane 
Irrigation Schemes. However, this report 
focuses on findings from Hereford only. 
The research was primarily concerned with 
the impact of BEE, articulated through joint 
ventures, on the ‘livelihoods’ of people living 
in emerging small-scale irrigation schemes in 
some of the least affluent rural areas within 
the municipality. 
The report examines joint ventures in 
the context of the Integrated Sustainable 
Rural Development Programme (ISRDP) 
and the Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development (LRAD) programme. The focus 
is on the sustainability of rural livelihoods, 
while attention is given to the stakeholder 
power dynamics at the local level. 
Although the inception of joint ventures 
has been greeted with optimism and renewed 
hope in certain circles within government, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
the private sector and small-scale irrigation 
schemes, so far the performance of joint 
ventures in Greater Sekhukhune has fallen 
short of expectations. The promise of higher 
incomes and improved livelihoods has 
remained elusive, and instead debts and 
potential losses of often meagre household 
assets have loomed large, threatening to 
erode existing livelihoods and undermine 
government interventions.
Our research findings suggest that the 
challenge of reducing rural poverty and 
inequality might not be resolved through 
existing approaches to joint ventures. While 
these facilitate the integration of resource-
poor irrigation farmers into the globalised 
mainstream commercial production sector, 
this might reinforce socio-economic 
disparities and undermine the livelihoods of 
the poorest and most vulnerable members of 
the irrigation schemes. 
This report proposes a re-examination of 
the current conceptualisation, implementation 
and monitoring of joint ventures. New 
vi
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approaches are needed to avert possible 
losses of livelihood and assets by resource-
poor irrigation farmers. It is particularly 
important to improve the administration of 
joint venture contracts. Although, generally 
rural people in Greater Sekhukhune have 
yet to realise their capacity to hold local 
political representatives accountable, it is up 
to municipalities to be more proactive and to 
actively ensure that local people’s interests 
are not subsumed by the interests of private 
capital.
1Chapter 1: Introduction
Defining sustainable rural 
livelihood
Livelihoods have been defined in terms of the capabilities, assets and activities required for living (Chambers 
& Conway 1992:7). The UNDP (1999:3) 
defines a livelihood system as a dynamic 
realm that integrates both the opportunities 
and assets available to a group of people for 
achieving their goals and aspirations as well 
as interactions with and exposure to a large 
range of beneficial or harmful ecological, 
social, economic and political influences that 
may help or hinder the group’s capacity to 
make a living. 
Definitions of the term ‘sustainable 
livelihoods’ relate to a wide set of issues 
which encompass much of the broader debate 
about the relationships between poverty and 
environment, but offer no clarity about how 
contradictions are addressed and trade-offs 
assessed (Scoones 1998). This study adopts 
the definition developed through the works of 
various scholars, including those of Hussein 
& Nelson (1998), Carswell (1997) and 
Chambers & Conway (1992), that sustainable 
livelihoods are those that can cope with, 
recover from and adapt to stresses and 
shocks, maintain or enhance their capabilities 
and assets and provide net benefits to other 
livelihoods locally and more widely, both 
now and in the future, without undermining 
the natural resource base. 
The focus on livelihood sustainability 
in emerging commercialised small-scale 
This chapter introduces the key terms of reference of the research 
report, and offers a definition of the term ‘sustainable rural livelihoods’ 
in the context of joint ventures in the Hereford emerging small-scale 
irrigation scheme in Greater Sekhukhune District. A key contention of 
this introductory chapter is that the livelihoods of resource-poor and 
vulnerable rural people might be compromised by neo-liberal elements of 
the prevailing development approach.
irrigation schemes is premised on the fact 
that such schemes are envisaged as playing 
a progressively larger role in reducing the 
poverty and inequality inherent in South 
Africa’s rural space economy (Ministry for 
Agriculture and Land Affairs 1998b). This is 
demonstrated by the targeting of agricultural 
investment in rural development nodes to 
provide livelihoods, infrastructure, irrigation, 
services and skills development (NDA 
2001). Emerging commercialised small-scale 
irrigation schemes are among the ‘anchor 
projects’ within Integrated Sustainable Rural 
Development Programme (ISRDP) nodes, 
such as Greater Sekhukhune District. 
The ISRDP is an institutional 
rationalisation strategy for aligning the 
activities of the three spheres of government 
with the local development priorities of 
selected poverty nodes (IDT 2000). An 
important feature of the ISRDP is that 
the programme is a hybrid of various 
development approaches, blending neo-
liberal and social welfare approaches within 
a somewhat vaguely articulated ‘sustainable 
development’ framework. The principal 
instrument for the ISRDP is the integrated 
development plan (IDP) which, in terms of 
the Local Government Municipal Systems 
Act 32 of 2000 (‘Systems Act’), must be 
developed by all municipalities in South 
Africa, whether they are poverty nodes or 
not. 
In this report, the IDP provides a useful 
framework for examining how relevant local 
governance structures have promoted or 
Chapter 1: Introduction
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failed to promote the sustainability of rural 
livelihoods in the context of joint ventures 
in emerging small-scale irrigation schemes 
within the Greater Sekhukhune ISRDP nodal 
district. 
Although rural development plans, such as 
IDPs in districts such as Greater Sekhukhune, 
have emphasised the importance of small-
scale irrigation schemes, viewed at a national 
scale the contribution of various schemes to 
agriculture and livelihoods seems modest. 
Some studies suggest that the majority of 
black farmers practise rain-fed cropping 
rather than irrigation. The majority of black 
arable farmers also practise subsistence rather 
than commercial farming (Perret 2001). The 
vision of a significant role for commercialised 
small-scale irrigation farming appears rather 
ambitious, given the constraints facing 
small-scale farmers. Nonetheless, emerging 
commercialised small-scale irrigation 
schemes provide a useful case study of how, 
within a predominantly neo-liberal economics 
policy context, the interplay between land 
and water policy, joint ventures and local 
governance might impact on resource-poor 
and vulnerable local people and, more 
broadly, provide lessons for how to address 
the challenge of rural poverty and inequality. 
The issue of livelihood sustainability 
in rural South Africa warrants particular 
attention for two reasons. First, the historical 
background of losses of livelihoods due to 
forced removals and the dispossession of land 
and other resources, described by Platzky & 
Walker (1985), places an ethical imperative 
on research to identify the livelihood impacts 
of on-going agrarian reforms and rural 
development interventions, and to suggest 
ways to ensure livelihood security. Second, 
the need to give attention to rural livelihood 
sustainability arises from observations that 
the spectre of uncertainty – due to livelihood 
insecurity and vulnerability – prevails in 
contemporary South African rural settings 
(SLSA Team 2003:7). 
As I write this report, a decade has 
passed since the advent of majority rule yet 
South Africa retains the historical legacy 
of a highly polarised space economy. 
Poverty and inequality persist in many 
rural areas, particularly in the former 
‘homelands’ (Van Rooyen et al. 2001; May 
2000; May et al. 1998). The range of sector 
reforms, development interventions and 
poverty reduction strategies that have been 
implemented have not made significant 
impacts on rural poverty and inequality 
(DBSA 1999 cited in Everatt 2004:9; 
Goldman et al. 2002; Cousins 2003; IDT 
2000). The increasing convergence, since 
the late 1990s, of reforms in rural production 
sectors indicates government’s recognition 
of the need to put in place a co-ordinated and 
effective institutional framework to eradicate 
poverty and to redistribute productive assets. 
This convergence is evident in the 
various policies, laws and strategies that 
have emerged to address redistribution. This 
is captured in Section 25:8 of the National 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights which expresses 
the state’s commitment to take legislative 
and other measures to achieve land, water 
and related reforms in order to ‘redress the 
results of past racial discrimination’. Such 
measures include the LRAD programme 
(DLA 2001), the Broad-based Black 
Economic Empowerment Framework for 
Agriculture (Agri BEE) (NDA 2004) and 
policies on Financial Assistance to Resource 
Poor Irrigation Farmers (DWAF 2004) and 
Water Allocation Reform (DWAF 2005), 
which derive from Sections 61 and 62 of the 
National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
As well as developing frameworks 
for redistribution, there have been moves 
towards institutional integration and co-
ordination in the water, land, agriculture, 
local government and related sectors. The 
view that the ‘silo’ approach to development 
has been a contributing factor to the failure 
of development interventions appears to 
have informed these moves. Frameworks 
and structures that give expression to 
institutional integration and co-ordination 
include the National Guidelines for Integrated 
Management of Agricultural Water Use 
(NDA 2000), Provincial Co-ordinating 
Committees for Agricultural Water 
(CCAWs), catchment management agencies, 
water user associations (WUAs), municipal 
IDPs and local economic development (LED) 
committees for agriculture. 
Government’s attempts to co-ordinate 
institutional frameworks and structures and 
3the government’s interest in ‘playing 
a significant role in the economy while 
fighting poverty’ in the Finance Minister’s 
2005 budget speech, in which expenditure on 
an expanding social security programme to 
cater for the poorest 40% of the population 
has been increased by 25% over the next five 
years (Friedman 2005). Notwithstanding the 
government’s efforts to balance conditions 
for economic growth with social security 
concerns, in many rural contexts structural 
conditions seem to favour the creation of a 
black farming elite.
Various scholars (Wilson et al. 2001:
4; Tarrow 1996:396 cited in Harris 2001:
1; Cousins 2003; Drummond & Maarsden 
1999) have argued that the persistence of 
poverty in developing countries, irrespective 
of more recent formulations for development, 
for example the ‘sustainable development 
approach’, has largely been a direct result 
of the broader structural factors inherent in 
a capitalist global political economy. The 
structural factors reinforce the divergence 
between core and the periphery, such that 
deliberate interventions have to be put in 
place to ensure that some development 
‘trickles down’to the periphery. Without 
a radical transformation of the structural 
factors, development interventions will 
remain ineffective. From this perspective, 
promoting an elite group of emergent black 
farmers through mechanisms such as the Agri 
BEE programme is not a sufficient means 
of resolving the rural poverty and inequality 
problem. 
Indications are that the livelihoods of 
resource-poor and vulnerable rural people 
might indeed be compromised by neo-liberal 
elements of the prevailing development 
approach. An important question centres on 
the possible negative impacts of hybrid neo-
liberal economics and the social development 
approach on the livelihoods of the poorest 
and most vulnerable people within farming 
communities. It is also debatable whether or 
not a new class of petty commodity producers 
can establish a viable niche within global 
commodity chains, in a context where the 
radical redistribution of land and water 
is constrained, and where the majority of 
black small-scale farmers face significant 
ensure the redistribution of productive assets 
are, indeed, laudable. The convergence of 
land, water, agriculture, local government and 
other sector reforms seems to have provided 
a semblance of the required policy, statutory 
and governance framework within which the 
challenges of poverty and inequality can be 
resolved, rural development achieved and 
livelihoods secured. However, there is some 
concern that the various sector reforms have 
been concomitant with the government’s 
policy shifts away from the focused anti-
poverty strategies of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) towards 
the national economic goals espoused by 
the Growth Employment and Redistribution 
(Gear) macro-economic strategy. 
A number of scholars (Cousins 2003; 
Borras 2003; Levin 2002; May 2000:7; 
Levin & Weiner 1996), drawing largely 
from radical political economy perspectives, 
have challenged neo-liberal approaches to 
development on the basis that these are often 
the cause of rural poverty and are therefore 
incapable of eradicating it. Cousins (2003) 
argues that contrary to conventional notions 
of poverty as ‘residual’ in character, the vast 
majority of rural dwellers are not so much 
excluded as included on highly adverse 
terms. His argument centres on the ‘agrarian 
question of the dispossessed’ (Cousins 2003:
41), which essentially revolves around the 
constituting of a new class of emergent 
petty commodity producers from the ranks 
of the desperately poor, a class which ‘must 
insert itself aggressively into the mainstream 
capitalist economy’. Without wide-ranging 
agrarian reform, the prospects of achieving 
this objective are debatable (Cousins 2003). 
Amid the policy shifts, however, the 
government has retained a commitment 
to both economic growth and social 
development. The ISRDP, implemented 
initially in designated nodal districts 
such as Greater Sekhukhune, and due 
to be implemented nationwide by 2010, 
demonstrates the hybrid nature of the 
government’s macro-economic policy. 
The programme draws from a diversity 
of development approaches and its vision 
blends economic growth and social security 
concerns. There is further evidence of 
Chapter 1: Introduction
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to agrarian reform is required. Jacobs, 
Lahiff & Hall (2003:27) suggest that there is 
a need for large-scale transfers of land and, 
where necessary, for government to adopt 
expropriation – with compensation – as a key 
tool for redistribution. The same might be 
said for the redistribution of water. Such 
radical measures call for substantial inputs of 
financial resources and political will within 
government to adopt more effective measures 
to address rural poverty and inequality 
and to promote a viable – not necessarily 
commercial – farming sector within the black 
peasantry. 
The recent adoption of the Policy on 
Financial Assistance to Resource Poor 
Irrigation Farmers (DWAF 2004) indicates 
a positive shift in political will and financial 
commitment towards promoting access 
to water by small-scale farmers. Yet 
the question still remains whether such 
a move has been echoed in the adoption 
of appropriate approaches to land and 
agricultural reform in the context of small-
scale irrigation schemes.
In the case of ‘water-stressed’ catchments 
such as the Olifants, within which the 
Phetwane and Hereford irrigation schemes 
are located, white commercial farmers 
continue to command a larger share of 
irrigation water and infrastructure (Tren 
& Schur 2000; Piontek 2000; Ligthelm 
2001). The National Water Act of 1998 has 
abolished ‘riparian rights’, thereby breaking 
the legal coupling of land and water rights 
and paving the way for the redistribution of 
water resources. The new policy on subsidies 
for resource-poor irrigation farmers also 
provides support for black farmers to gain 
access to water resources for productive 
purposes. However, the unfolding water 
reallocation process does not seem to offer 
many options for a radical and sustainable 
redistribution of water. 
The articulation of water reforms has been 
characterised by inadequate communication 
of the legal requirement for designated 
users to register their water use, with the 
result that many black farmers have not 
been informed of this. Consequently, the 
registration of lawful use by established 
white commercial farming sectors has been 
relatively higher than that by black farmers. 
constraints to effective participation in the 
highly competitive and globalised commodity 
production sector. Of particular concern is the 
view within certain government, civil society 
and private circles that joint ventures provide 
an effective means for small-scale farmers to 
enter the commodity production sector.
Joint ventures involving private investors 
and producers, and supported by government 
agencies, are seen as providing the financial, 
technical, managerial and marketing 
resources required by black farmers. 
However, critics have argued that joint 
ventures are a new form of exploitation and a 
mechanism through which white commercial 
farmers spread the risk of engaging in an 
increasingly complex and capital-intensive 
sector, while gaining market and political 
credibility in the process (Mayson 2003). We 
can learn from the experiences of other less 
developed countries (LDCs) elsewhere with 
joint ventures; these suggest that producers’ 
control of the production process is reduced, 
and cash crops are produced at the expense 
of local food production and food security 
(Jacobs 2001:28). 
Furthermore, trade liberalisation policies, 
such as the World Trade Organisation’s 
Agreement on Agriculture, coerce LDCs to 
phase out subsidies, exchange controls and 
trade barriers without imposing the same 
conditions in the north (Jacobs 2001:28). 
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures, as 
well as Provisions of the European Union’s 
Common Agricultural Policy, are used as 
non-trade barriers to protect producers in the 
north and to make it difficult for producers 
in LDCs to compete (Madonsela 2001:1, 
cited in Jacobs 2001:29), which could result 
in resource-poor farmers being pushed out 
of the production game. Although the South 
African government has adopted a policy to 
subsidise resource-poor irrigation farmers, 
the proliferation of joint ventures in small-
scale irrigation schemes raises questions 
over the extent to which government policy 
interventions can enhance the interests 
of black farmers in settings such as those 
prevailing in designated poverty nodes.
On the issue of overcoming dualism in 
South Africa’s rural space economy, Cousins 
(2003) asserts that a more radical approach 
5Similarly, there has been greater participation 
in the predominantly white Irrigation Boards’ 
processes to establish local level WUAs than 
of black farmers. While government officials 
cite the lack of institutional capacity to 
drive a broad and effective public awareness 
initiative as a major constraint, the top-down 
and centre-driven approach to the formation 
of new water management structures also 
appears to have contributed to this problem. 
Given the provision that a review and 
possible reallocation of registered water 
use should take place after a period of five 
years, and that reallocations detracting from 
existing lawful use have to be justified, the 
process of redistributing water is likely to 
be ‘technically demanding and contentious’ 
(DWAF 2005). 
The emphasis on ‘efficiency’ in water 
use, the ‘user-pays’ principle and the 
payment of water charges at the ‘economic 
value’ of water further narrow the prospects 
for resource-poor emerging black farmers 
securing equitable access to water. An 
illustration of the small-scale farmers’ 
dilemma relates to inter-sectoral competition 
for water between the mining sector and the 
emerging small-scale farmers in the Olifants 
Basin (Farolfi & Perret 2002). This seems 
to compel small-scale farmers, whose profit 
margins are relatively low (Tren & Schur 
2000), towards trading away a greater share 
of their water allocation to the mines who 
can afford to offset the water prices. The 
commoditisation of water resources poses 
a threat to the sustainability of gains made 
by black farmers in terms of the new Policy 
on Financial Assistance to Resource Poor 
Irrigation Farmers (DWAF 2004). 
The possible negative effects of 
commoditisation of water resonate with the 
effects of market-based land reform. Recent 
studies (Jacobs et al. 2003:25) suggest that 
reliance on the market to acquire land has 
resulted in a strong and increasing emphasis 
on commercial agriculture. Applications for 
land reform grants are required to adhere 
to stringent commercial criteria to qualify 
for land purchase grants and loans, and 
applicants are required to procure support 
services, such as business planning, extension 
and finance, from the private sector. Small-
scale production, particularly for household 
consumption, ‘hardly features in official 
redistribution thinking’, and state agricultural 
support services are unavailable in many 
parts of the country (Jacobs et al. 2003). In 
light of these factors, Jacobs et al. (2003:25) 
conclude that the prospects of the very poor 
accessing LRAD funding are increasingly 
in doubt. Thus it is difficult to see how a 
commercialised approach to the allocation of 
land and water resources and to agricultural 
production can contribute to sustainable 
livelihoods in contexts where poverty is 
rampant, such as in the small-scale irrigation 
schemes in Greater Sekhukhune. 
Cousins (2003:43, 45) proposes that 
a sustainable livelihoods approach that 
builds on the land-based livelihoods which 
rural people currently practise and which 
enhances their economic value might be more 
appropriate than attempting to replace these 
livelihoods with fully market-orientated or 
commercialised approaches. At the same 
time, he recognises that it is clear that the 
deep poverty in rural areas requires radical 
measures, not least a redistribution of 
resources including land. Friedman’s (2005) 
observation that attempts to deal with poverty 
are ineffective because they do not reflect 
what the poor want, suggests the need for the 
poor to participate more actively in shaping 
the development agenda. Lessons might be 
derived from LDCs elsewhere.
Research methodology
Both primary and secondary data sources 
were used during the research process. 
Primary data sources included direct 
observation, informal conversations and 
discussions, semi-structured formal and 
informal in-depth interviews, questionnaires, 
focus group discussions, networking with 
relevant researchers, and workshops with 
various stakeholders. Secondary data 
sources included documents pertaining to 
relevant policy, legislation, plans, strategies, 
programmes and projects, community 
records, electronic databases, statistical 
survey reports, published and unpublished 
literature and other document sources 
compiled by government, civil society and 
the private sector.
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The research framework for the study 
revolved around livelihoods, institutions 
and land and water resources. The analytical 
framework for the study was adapted from 
the Sustainable Rural Livelihoods framework 
developed by Scoones (1998). 
For each of the selected study sites, the 
following baseline data was collected and 
analysed:
• livelihood profiles of the irrigation 
farmers’ households 
• land and water allocations, uses, 
development, safeguarding, control and 
contestation
• institutional structures, processes, roles, 
resources and relationships.
Livelihood profiling offered a means to 
establishing a base line for normative 
descriptions and analyses of characteristics of 
the population in the selected site. Livelihood 
profiles also provided a useful background 
to the power and gender dynamics emerging 
from or concomitant with commercialisation. 
Empirical research on livelihood profiles took 
place in two stages. 
The initial stage involved determining 
the profile of the study site; this was done by 
means of questionnaire surveys. Particular 
attention was paid to the gender dimensions 
of poverty and inequality at the household 
level. The target sample size for the first 
stage was 100% in the selected site. At 
such a scale, the profile could only offer 
a generalised overview of the population 
composition, in terms of variables such as 
age, gender, literacy rates and language, 
livelihood assets, strategies, resilience 
and vulnerability. The second stage of the 
livelihood profiling therefore sought to elicit 
greater nuance. 
Data collection during the second stage 
took place mainly through direct observation, 
informal conversation and in-depth 
interviews. Since poverty and inequality are 
experienced differentially among members 
of a household, emphasis was placed on 
determining individual profiles. Because of 
the demanding time requirements of in-depth 
data collection, a relatively small sample 
was drawn, and the primary emphasis was 
placed on qualitative rigour rather than 
representivity. The data collected at the 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme were triangulated 
with data in relevant externally-based 
institutions.
Land and water resources are considered 
critical to the generation of both farm and 
non-farm based livelihoods in the selected 
sites. These resources are a key component 
of the basket of household and community 
livelihood assets. It was thus necessary to 
collect data on land and water allocation, 
tenure, land use and land development and 
management. 
Institutions involved in the 
commercialisation processes influence the 
dynamics surrounding livelihood generation 
strategies and entitlements to land and 
water in the selected irrigation schemes. 
Data generation and analysis of institutional 
process, resilience and outcome variables 
focused at two levels of analysis, namely the 
joint ventures and the small-scale irrigation 
farmers’ group level. Process variables 
included representation, responsiveness 
to participation, accountability and 
transparency, relationships with small-scale 
farmers, local communities, traditional 
authorities and elected councillors (or local 
authorities), relationships among stakeholder 
institutions, co-ordination, communications 
and performance and impact monitoring. 
Resilience variables included legitimacy, 
robustness and compliance. Outcome 
variables pertaining to small-scale irrigators’ 
groups and to the rural people residing in 
the irrigation scheme areas included equity, 
efficiency and sustainability. 
Institutional analysis also involved 
reviews of literature pertaining to stakeholder 
power politics, gender issues and case 
studies on commercialisation processes in 
small-scale irrigation schemes elsewhere, 
such as in countries in Asia namely: India, 
Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Vietnam and 
Indonesia (IWMI 2005), Latin America 
namely: Ecuador (Bastidas 1999) and Mexico 
(Kloezen et al. 1997) and Africa namely: 
Burkina Faso (Zwarteveen 1997) and Kenya 
(Krishna et al. 2004). The investigation of 
stakeholder power dynamics was conducted 
within three units of analysis namely, the 
joint venture, irrigation farmer group and 
irrigation farmer households. This report 
focuses mainly on power dynamics within 
joint ventures.
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Location and spatial extent
Greater Sekhukhune District is a cross-
border district municipality straddling the 
boundary between the southern part of the 
Limpopo Province and the north-western 
portion of the Mpumalanga Province of 
South Africa (Figure 1). The spatial area of 
the district is approximately 1 326 437ha 
(Greater Sekhukhune Cross Border District 
Municipality 2005; Greater Sekhukhune 
Cross Border District Municipality 2002). 
The district is located close to larger urban 
centres such as Pretoria, Polokwane and 
Nelspruit. The five local municipalities 
constituting Greater Sekhukhune District 
are Makhuduthamaga, Fetakgomo, Greater 
Tubatse, Greater Groblersdal and Greater 
Marble Hall. All of these are located 
within the Olifants River Basin. However, 
Makhuduthamaga and Fetakgomo are located 
entirely within Limpopo Province, while 
Greater Groblersdal, Greater Marble Hall 
and Greater Tubatse are cross-border local 
municipalities. This research report focuses 
on a study site within the Greater Groblersdal 
local municipality.
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Physiographic features
Greater Sekhukhune District is characterised 
by variations in relief, climate and vegetation. 
The undulating grassy plains of the Highveld 
give way to the lower-lying Bushveld areas 
and the mountainous terrain dissected by 
the Oliphants River system. Rainfall is 
seasonal, distributed mostly in the summer 
months between November and April while 
the winters are generally cool and dry. The 
varied micro-climates, hydrology and aspect 
in the mountainous parts have produced 
micro-variations in vegetation. The beauty 
and ecological diversity of the area have 
encouraged the establishment of a number of 
tourist resorts and nature reserves. 
Population size and distribution
According to the 2001 population census, the 
total population for the district is 
967 197 (Stats SA 2001). This represents 
an increase of approximately 54 347 people 
from the figure of 912 850 in the census of 
1996 (Stats SA 1996). However, there are 
inconsistencies in the existing statistical 
data on the total population of Greater 
Sekhukhune. Stats SA census figures indicate 
that from 1996 to 2001 the population for the 
local municipalities in the district increased 
by an average of 1.2%. But according to the 
data provided by the 1995 Water Services 
Development Plan (WSDP) of DWAF, in 
1995 the total district population was 
974 830, indicating a decrease of 7 366 
people in the period 1995 to 2001. Yet, while 
the IDP document of 2002 formally accepts 
this figure, the 2004–5 IDP document uses 
the 2001 census data. It is to be hoped that the 
current district IDP has verified the Stats SA 
2001 census data and not simply overlooked 
a discrepancy of over 62 000 people between 
the total population data provided by the 
1995 WSDP and that provided by the 
1996 census data. Repercussions of such a 
discrepancy might include under-budgeting 
for interventions within the poverty node.
Women comprise 55.5% of the total 
population in Greater Sekhukhune District 
(Stats SA 2001). According to the 1996 
and 2001 census statistics (Stats SA 1996; 
2001) 94.7% of the population reside in 
rural areas, while the rest is concentrated in 
urban centres such as Groblersdal, Marble 
Hall and Burgersfort. The rural population 
is distributed in varying densities across the 
district. Makhuduthamaga and Fetakgomo, 
which correspond to the former homeland 
areas of Lebowa, have the greatest rural 
population densities. Other densely populated 
rural areas occur in Nebo and Moutse, 
which are large cluster settlements located 
in erstwhile Lebowa and KwaNdebele 
homeland areas, and in Dennilton, a formerly 
designated ‘black’ area within apartheid 
South Africa. The rest of the rural population 
of Greater Sekhukhune (less than 1 000 
people) is scattered among the numerous 
small settlements that are dispersed over 
much of the district municipal area. 
Historical context
Peter Delius (1996) succinctly summarises 
the history of Greater Sekhukhune District as 
follows:
Sekhukhuneland was the heartland of 
the formidable Pedi Kingdom which 
long held the Swazi, the British and the 
Boers at bay. In the twentieth century it 
was transformed into an impoverished 
and overcrowded ‘reserve’ but 
remained a byword for rural 
resistance; in the 1980s it achieved 
national notoriety as the epicentre of 
witch burnings.
It is worth noting that black people of 
Greater Sekhukhune District have historically 
played a significant role in rural resistance 
to both colonialism and apartheid, within 
a context where much of the resistance in 
post-Second World War South Africa was 
urban proletariat based. People like the late 
Flag Boshielo, after whom the water supply 
dam above the Phetwane Irrigation Scheme 
(the research site not included in this report) 
is named, are documented as having actively 
pioneered the initial armed resistance against 
apartheid. The historical onslaught on the 
local political power structure, dispossession 
of land and related resources and erosion of 
livelihoods appear to have provided a strong 
impetus to the early phases of resistance to 
colonialism by the Pedi of Sekhukhuneland. 
After this, the rural–urban linkages between 
Sekhukhuneland and urban-industrial 
centres also fostered the rural resistance 
to colonialism, and later to apartheid. This 
9was articulated mainly through the migrant 
labour system. Sekhukhuneland became a 
major source of cheap labour for the colonial 
political economy following the defeat of 
Sekhukhune by the combined British, Boer 
and Swazi onslaught. The term ‘Nebo’, which 
today refers to a densely populated region 
within Makhuduthaga local municipality in 
Greater Sekhukhune District, originated as 
an acronym for ‘Native Employment Bureau 
Office’. 
Following the re-alignment of municipal 
boundaries in terms of the Municipal 
Demarcation Act of 1998, the contemporary 
configuration of Greater Sekhukhune District 
has brought together rural people with a 
diversity of backgrounds and cultures, mainly 
the Pedi, Ndebele, Ntwane (Tswana) and the 
Swazi, among others. Although these have 
historically experienced varying degrees of 
conflict over time, conditions of poverty and 
inequality have been an enduring common 
factor. 
Socio-economic features 
Greater Sekhukhune District has a dualistic 
socio-economic structure of the kind found in 
many of South Africa’s rural municipalities 
which have been demarcated since the 
promulgation of the Municipal Demarcation 
Act No. 27 of 1998. The settlement pattern 
indicates the social and physical segregation 
of communities. The relative affluence of 
the formerly designated ‘white’ commercial 
areas contrasts with the high levels of poverty 
and unemployment in the non-commercial 
former ‘black’ areas. The latter have a lower 
Human Development Index (HDI), with 
large backlogs in services and infrastructure, 
and very small or non-existent economic 
bases. Recently there have been moves to 
promote economic integration and equity 
through various BEE initiatives, including the 
commercialisation of small-scale irrigation 
schemes. However, the underlying dualism 
largely endures in many sectors and areas 
within the district. 
Commercial agriculture provides the 
bulk of employment opportunities in the 
district, but more than half of the population 
(64.8%) is unemployed (Stats SA 2002), 
particularly the youth (defined as between 
15 to 35 years). In the past, the government 
service sector provided a significant number 
of the jobs in the district, however this 
sector has shrunk and therefore is now less 
able to absorb prospective labour (Greater 
Sekhukhune IDP 2002). Lack of employment 
opportunities has encouraged the migration 
of significant numbers of the rural population 
to various urban centres, including centres in 
the Gauteng Province. Table 1 summarises 
selected characteristics of the district. 
According to the data in Table 1 salaries 
and wages, remittances, pensions, grants 
and access to agricultural land make 
significant contributions to livelihoods 
in the district. There are relatively low 
proportions of households with access to land 
for agricultural use (30.4%) and engaged 
in crop farming (30%). There are very 
low proportions of households engaged in 
livestock farming (1.2%) and horticulture 
(0.3%), as well as households which depend 
on the sale of farm produce as the main 
source of income (1.2%). Debates around 
integrated development plans (IDPs) and 
local economic development (LED) in the 
district indicate that land redistribution 
and greater involvement of black people 
in the farming sector are priority issues in 
Greater Sekhukhune (Tapela 2002; Greater 
Sekhukhune IDP 2002; Greater Sekhukhune 
District Status Report, January to July 2003). 
The key challenges for development in 
Greater Sekhukhune District, as outlined by 
the District Status Report for January to July 
2003, are:
• poor social and economic infrastructure 
in all areas of the municipality
• poor social and physical integration of 
the communities of the district
• high poverty levels
• gender inequality
• inaccessibility of basic services such as 
health and education
• lack of economic opportunities and 
wealth creation for the majority of the 
population
• landlessness
• environmentally unsustainable utilisation 
of resources in the area
• under-utilisation of the tourism potential 
within the nodal area, and 
• under-utilisation of agricultural potential 
in both production and agri-processing.
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According to Delius (1996), contemporary 
conditions in the Sekhukhune region 
exemplify the daunting task of reconstruction 
demanded of South Africa’s democratically-
elected government. Greater Sekhukhune 
District is one of 13 rural poverty nodes 
identified in 2001 for accelerated rural 
development through the South African 
government’s ISRDP. The active role played 
by the rural people of Greater Sekhukhune 
in the struggle against colonialism and 
apartheid, and the prevailing impoverishment 
and inequality seem to have been strong 
compelling factors for the government to 
prioritise the district for the ISRDP. The 
question, though, is whether this will translate 
into a tangible improvement of livelihoods 
for rural people.
The ISRDP 
In July 2000, the ISRDP was launched by the 
South African government, after consultation 
with a wide range of key stakeholders, in a 
renewed attempt to improve opportunities for 
the rural poor and to ensure their wellbeing 
(IDT 2000:iv). Prior to this, the Office of the 
Presidency of South Africa had directed the 
formulation process for the ISRD Strategy 
(ISRDS), and President Thabo Mbeki had 
formally announced the ISRDS on June 25 
1999. 
The ISRDP is the product of a concerted 
effort by the South African government, 
acting in conjunction with local, national 
and international structures and networks 
(IDT 2000). The programme draws from 
a diversity of development approaches and 
interests. Indeed, international frameworks 
such as Agenda 21 and the Millenium 
Development Goals appear to have 
significantly influenced the drafting of the 
ISRDP. While this enriched the discourses 
that informed the ISRDP design process, the 
same diversity has also created difficulties in 
the conceptualisation of the rural challenge in 
South Africa and the requisite interventions. 
These difficulties are reflected in the ongoing 
debate on whether the ISRDP provides an 
Characteristic Measure (as a %)
Unemployment rate (in terms of the expanded definition)  64.8   
Proportion of households below minimum living level (R1 100 p.a.)  77.4
Proportion of female-headed households  58.6
Proportion of households with access to land for agriculture  30.4
Proportion of households engaged in field crop farming  30.0
Proportion of households engaged in livestock farming    1.2
Proportion of households engaged in horticulture    0.3
Proportion of households which never had a problem in satisfying their food 
needs
 28.9
Proportion of households which depend on sale of farm produce as main 
source of income
   1.2
Proportion of households which depend on remittances as the main source of 
income
  29.1
Proportion of households which depend on pensions and grants as the main 
source of income
 37.8
Proportion of households which depend on salaries and/or wages  21.6
Proportion of households which depend on other sources of income    6.9
Proportion of households with NO income    3.3
Sources: Stats SA 2002; Sekhukhune IDP Document 2002:20.
Table 1: Greater Sekhukhune: Summary of selected living conditions, 2002
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adequate construct for the resolution of the 
rural challenge. 
Origins 
The ISRDP emerged during the African 
National Congress’s (ANC’s) second term 
in government. Everatt (2004:3) asserts 
that between 1999 and 2004, there was 
a shift away from the previous (1994–1999) 
emphasis on policy formulation and releasing 
resources to benefit the majority of citizens 
towards a focus on implementation and 
service delivery, including better organisation 
of government through mechanisms such as 
the Cabinet Cluster system. The beginnings 
of this shift were rooted in the ANC’s first 
term in government. This was the design 
phase of the Cabinet Cluster system and 
systems and structures such as the Poverty 
Relief Fund, the annual Cabinet Lekgotlas 
and the Medium Term Strategic Framework. 
However, there are varying views regarding 
the contributions of the policy and legal 
frameworks developed in the ANC 
government’s first term of office. 
One view (Everatt 2004:4) is that the 
ISRDP was a response to the failure of the 
Rural Development Strategy and the Rural 
Development Framework to articulate 
a clear methodology for achieving the RDP 
requirements and standards, due to a lack 
of experience with the complexities of 
governance. Everatt’s view is therefore that 
the RDP provided the key macro-policy 
that set out the delivery requirements and 
standards for the ISRDP. Another view 
(Van Rooyen et al. 2001:42) recognises the 
role of both the RDP and Gear in providing 
the policy grounding of the ISRDP, the 
latter being seen as providing the requisite 
stable macro-economic framework. The 
contrasting views probably reflect divergence 
in the conceptual bases for the ISRDP and 
contradictory perspectives on the broader 
rural development approach adopted 
by government as well as reflecting the 
interests and tensions inherent in the policy 
framework. 
Notwithstanding the diversity of 
conceptual foundations and the impacts of 
international frameworks on the ISRDP, 
there seem also to have been some 
practical national and local imperatives for 
government intervention. Practitioners within 
various sector departments appear to have 
recognised the weaknesses inherent in the 
uncoordinated delivery of assets and services. 
For example, the ‘cluster’ delivery model 
developed by the National Department of 
Public Works (NDPW) for implementing the 
Community Based Public Works Programme 
became the ‘nodal’ model for the ISRDP 
(Everatt 2004).
The degree to which the nationally 
and locally driven imperatives for the 
ISRDP reflect rural people’s interests 
might ultimately prove to be the key 
reckoning factor determining the impacts of 
interventions on the livelihoods of resource-
poor people in designated poverty nodes in 
South Africa. 
Vision and mechanisms for 
implementation 
The vision of the ISRDP is to: 
 attain socially cohesive and stable rural 
economies with viable institutions, 
sustainable economies and universal 
access to social amenities, able to attract 
and retain skilled and knowledgeable 
people who are equipped to contribute to 
growth and development (IDT 2000:19). 
The articulation of this vision involves an 
incremental approach wherein the initial 
focus on 13 identified pilot nodal areas shall 
be broadened to embrace all impoverished 
rural areas in the country by the year 2010. A 
further 17 nodes were identified in September 
2003 but have yet to be gazetted. 
The articulation of the ISRDP vision also 
involves the integration and co-ordination 
of rural development interventions by 
various sectors and spheres of government 
in South Africa. In this regard, the integrated 
development planning process provides 
the principal instrument for integration and 
co-ordination, as required by the ‘Systems 
Act’. This act gives municipalities the legal 
responsibility to undertake IDP processes to 
guide and inform all planning, budgeting, 
management and decision making in 
municipal areas, and therefore places 
municipalities in a key position to co-ordinate 
the ISRDP. 
The central positioning of municipalities 
in the implementation of the ISRDP reflects 
Chapter 1: Introduction
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management and funding mechanisms to 
focus the expenditure of the three spheres of 
government in order to more effectively and 
efficiently respond to needs and opportunities 
(See Figure 2). It is perhaps worth noting that 
the implementation approach is not based 
on additional funding from government, but 
on increasing efficiency in the application 
of public funds to create appropriate outputs 
in the rural areas where they are required. 
Towards this end, the structures and 
procedures of the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework provide the mechanism for 
rationalising national and provincial budget 
structures into an ‘amalgamated expenditure 
envelope’ to meet ISRDP objectives. 
Mobilisation of funds takes place through 
various delivery structures and relationships, 
including the economic, social and 
infrastructure ‘clusters’ and ‘partnerships’ 
of various state organs, the private sector, 
public-private partnerships and the donor 
sector. 
the government’s objective to decentralise 
political and administrative decision making 
to local authorities. Other policy objectives 
pertaining to rural development include:
• the promotion of macro-economic 
stability to create favourable conditions 
for investment and trade 
• agricultural policy reform to remove 
distortions and enhance competitiveness 
in the agricultural sector 
• investment in infrastructure and service 
delivery to strengthen links between rural 
areas and the economy as a whole, to 
reduce the costs of production in rural 
localities and to make rural areas more 
desirable places in which to live 
• investment in human capital to enhance 
the skills and health of rural people
• broadly-based ownership of land and 
productive assets to address the historical 
inequalities in access to land and housing 
(Goldman et al. 2002). 
The implementation of the ISRDP involves 
the use of existing institutional, planning, 
SOURCES OF FUNDS
Private sector
Inter-governmental
fiscal flows/ tax 
revenues & user fees
Ministerial 
budgetsOther
Private sectorMunicipal budgets
Line function 
1 2 3 4
NGOs, donors 
& others
Municipal expenditure on programmes
Basket of programmes
Source: IDT 2000:28.
Figure 2: Amalgamated expenditure envelope for funding the ISRDP
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The implementation of the ISRDP has 
included the establishment of political and 
technical institutions to drive, manage and 
implement the programme across the three 
spheres of government (see Box 1).
It is evident that the ISRDP is basically 
an institutional rationalisation strategy for 
aligning the activities of all three spheres 
of government with local development 
priorities. Although the ISRDP has 
no tangible development outputs, the 
implementation framework for the 
programme includes the identification of 
‘anchor projects’ around which the various 
development initiatives will revolve. Small-
scale irrigation schemes constitute some 
of the 17 anchor projects in the Greater 
Sekhukhune District.
Despite achievements in setting up 
a variety of institutional arrangements to 
implement the ISRDP and the identification 
of nodal anchor projects, a common view is 
that the implementation of the programme 
has been beset with a number of difficulties. 
Prior to the onset of the ISRDP in 2001, 
the national Inter-Departmental Task Team 
identified the following challenges: 
• insufficient alignment across the three 
spheres of government
• lack of adequate funding and technical 
inputs for projects
• slow response by institutional systems 
and actors to the demands for new 
protocols of organisational behaviour 
• poor visibility and support of political 
champions. 
An evaluation of the ISRDP, on behalf 
of the Independent Development Trust 
(IDT) in 2004, showed that there had 
been only limited improvements over the 
previous four years and the programme 
was still beset with insufficient capacity 
and inadequate co-ordination with and 
participation by provincial and national 
departments (Everatt et al. 2004). Although 
a great deal of money had been made 
available for capacity-building initiatives in 
the nodes, such funding was not guided by 
clear planning. Institutional arrangements 
at the nodal level had yet to be sufficiently 
refined. Although relations between district 
and local municipalities seemed to be 
generally adequate, there were problematic 
undercurrents that needed to be dealt 
with. The IDP process required greater 
participation by the national sphere and 
better co-ordination of planning, budgeting 
and delivery between all the spheres of 
government.
 The previously mentioned challenges 
have been compounded by the fact that 
the ISRDP has emerged within a context 
• An inter-governmental relations organalysis that outlines the key roles and 
 responsibilities of critical entities across all spheres of government.
• The assignation of a core group of 14 national ministers to act in pairs as political 
‘champions’ for individual provinces and rural nodes.
• The identification of political and technical champions at the provincial and nodal 
municipal levels.
• The establishment of an Inter-Departmental Task Team structure to manage and 
 co-ordinate the ISRDP nationally.
• The initiation of a process to establish provincial and nodal municipality Technical 
 Co-ordinating Committees to manage and co-ordinate the ISRDP at an operational level.
• The initiation of process to establish nodal delivery teams in all the nodal district 
municipalities.
• The identification of ‘anchor’ projects for each of the 13 pilot nodal areas, and the 
incorporation of these into the relevant IDPs.
Source: IDT 2002.
Box 1: Some key outputs of the ISRDP
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in which there has been ‘very little 
concentration on spatial planning in rural 
areas to succeed the former apartheid 
planning strategies’ (Swartz et al. 2003:3). 
Some challenges to implementing the 
ISRDP in Greater Sekhukhune  
The implementation of the ISRDP in Greater 
Sekhukhune appears to have been beset 
by obstacles relating to local government 
reform. Institutional capacity seems to have 
been lacking or not robust enough. There 
have been insufficient administrative skills, 
inadequate office infrastructure, high staff 
turn-over, lack of co-ordination between the 
technical and the political champions of the 
ISRDP and difficulties in mobilising funding 
for anchor projects. Residual differences 
in the budgeting cycles of the District 
Municipality and national and provincial 
departments have also posed a difficulty to 
the financing of projects prioritised in the 
IDPs. The District Municipality has also 
faced problems in co-ordinating projects 
across local municipal jurisdictions. To some 
extent, this problem appears to have been due 
to the failure by the District Municipality to 
overcome the negative effects of competition 
among the various local municipalities. 
The problem of co-ordination has also 
been exacerbated by the cross-border issue. 
Some respondents have expressed concerns 
over the possible capture of resources by 
people belonging either to ‘Mpumalanga’ 
or to ‘Limpopo’ provinces. These concerns 
are mostly associated with the Greater 
Groblersdal cross-border local municipality, 
which brings together the former white 
commercial areas, black township areas 
and the Lebowa homeland, as well as 
people of different ethnic identities. Beyond 
people’s perceptions of capture, there have 
been practical governance issues around 
co-ordinating the enforcement of differing 
by-laws of two provinces within the same 
cross-border municipality. Finally, funding of 
projects in the cross-border municipality by 
provincial departments has been split along 
provincial lines. To many people this has 
created the impression that the municipality 
favours one province over the other. 
In an attempt to resolve the cross-border 
co-ordination problems, an Inter-Provincial 
Co-ordination Committee was established 
in 2003. This research could not establish 
how effective this structure has been. The 
existence of this provincial level structure 
did not, however, change the ground level 
perceptions of difference or reduce the 
suspicions emanating from these perceptions. 
Co-ordination problems are compounded 
by the persistence of the sectoral approach, 
and many government officials have 
continued to work within the ambit of 
their line departments irrespective of the 
requirements for integration. Municipal 
actors express frustration over the apparent 
disregard by many senior government 
officials of the municipalities’ legal mandate 
to co-ordinate development within local 
authority jurisdictions. This disregard 
involves the generally inconsistent attendance 
of municipal meetings by senior government 
officials, who often send junior officials 
despite such meetings requiring input from 
officials with decision-making authority. 
Interviews with senior government 
officials in 2003 revealed a perception 
that the governance process prescribed by 
the ‘Systems Act’ is too cumbersome and 
time-consuming for effective delivery. 
Given the requirements of the Performance 
Management System introduced by 
government, many officials therefore tend 
to prioritise activities within their key 
performance areas, to the detriment of 
the development co-ordination activities 
of municipalities. Staff of institutions 
providing support to the Greater Sekhukhune 
municipality express the view that there 
is a need for government to make active 
participation in development co-ordination 
activities mandatory for all relevant 
senior officials. It is acknowledged that 
the municipality needs to be proactive in 
ensuring that it has the capacity to play the 
co-ordination function effectively. 
The problem of institutional participation 
appears to have been associated with the early 
phase of the local governance framework 
that emerged in 2001 following the passing 
of the ‘Systems Act’. The problem might be 
interpreted as having been one of institutional 
inertia, in which government officials 
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continued with procedures and practices that 
had become outdated by the new governance 
policy and laws. Since 2004, there has been 
a shift towards more active participation by 
government officials in various development 
co-ordination committees, within and outside 
municipal structures in Greater Sekhukhune. 
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Currently the general view of people 
working in government departments, NGOs 
and the private sector is that development 
co-ordination by municipalities can be 
improved. This view is often associated with 
the management of IDP processes and LED 
structures by municipalities.
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Characteristics 
In Greater Sekhukhune, there are basically two types of emerging small-scale irrigation scheme associated with 
BEE through joint ventures. The first type 
comprises schemes located in the formerly 
white commercial farming areas, such as 
the Hereford Irrigation Scheme. This type 
of scheme, often associated with the DLA’s 
LRAD programme, the NDA’s Farmer 
Settlement Programme and the DLA’s 
erstwhile Settlement and Land Acquisition 
Grant, is not very common. Indeed, the slow 
pace of the LRAD programme is considered 
a ‘burning issue’ by emerging black farmers 
in Sekhukhune, while DLA officials attribute 
this to the prevalence of overlapping and 
competing land claims and delays in the 
processing of grants. The second type of 
irrigation scheme includes government-
owned schemes located in communal lands 
of the former Lebowa homeland, such as 
the Upper Arabie, the Mid-Arabie Olifants 
and the Lepellane irrigation schemes. Both 
types of scheme involve a shift towards 
transferring of land rights, water allocations 
and responsibility for irrigation management 
to black small-scale farmers, with financial, 
material, technical and other support from 
government departments, civil society and 
the private sector. For the government-owned 
irrigation schemes, this initiative is termed 
Chapter 2: Emerging small-scale 
irrigation in Greater Sekhukhune 
In the context of the ISRDP, there has been an acceleration of attempts 
to promote economic integration and equity in the agricultural sector 
within the Greater Sekhukhune District. Small-scale irrigation farming and 
joint ventures are envisaged as constituting the key routes towards black 
economic empowerment in agriculture. This chapter outlines key issues 
pertaining to the commercialisation of small-scale irrigation schemes in the 
district.
the ‘Revitalisation of Smallholder Irrigation 
Schemes’ (RESIS) programme. 
The key government departments 
involved in the ongoing collaborative effort 
to promote entry by black farmers into 
commercial agriculture include the DLA, the 
NDA, DWAF and the provincial departments 
of Agriculture and Public Works. A number 
of actors from the non-governmental and 
private sectors have also been involved, 
the latter mainly through joint ventures. 
This collaborative effort is captured in IDP 
documents within the Greater Sekhukhune 
District. Two of the small-scale irrigation 
schemes, namely the Mid-Arabie Olifants 
and the Lepellane, are among the 17 ISRDP 
anchor projects for the district. 
Despite support for the commercialisation 
of small-scale irrigation schemes, inroads 
by black irrigation farmers into the 
predominantly white commercial farming 
sector remain small. Likewise, the RESIS 
programme’s impact on the structure of 
small-scale agriculture has been minimal. 
Nonetheless, there is a heightened 
preoccupation in certain government, 
civil society and private sector circles 
with promoting joint ventures in Greater 
Sekhukhune, based on the assumption 
that these are critically important to the 
integration of black irrigation farmers into 
the mainstream commercial production sector 
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and, by extension, to equity in the irrigation 
farming sector. 
Challenges 
Water access issues 
Water scarcity is a major concern in the 
district. Not only is the Olifants catchment 
area drought-prone, but all the available 
water appears to have already been 
allocated, mostly to commercial irrigation, 
tourism, industrial and domestic uses. 
While discrepancies in various data sets 
regarding water availability and usage in 
the Olifants catchment area make it difficult 
to determine the precise nature of the water 
scarcity problem, there is agreement that 
the established commercial farming sector 
accounts for the bulk of water usage. By 
contrast, emerging small-scale irrigation 
farmers currently have insufficient water and 
a number of interventions are underway to 
improve water access for this sector. 
A worrying factor is that the local 
authorities in Greater Sekhukhune do not 
seem to have adequately conceptualised 
the issues underlying water scarcity. The 
Greater Sekhukhune District IDP links the 
problem of scarcity to visions of exponential 
population growth that might eventually 
exert an excessive demand on the available 
water resources. No mention is made of the 
challenge of inequality in the existing water 
allocations. Moreover, the ongoing debate 
among water sector stakeholders on the 
livelihood implications of commoditising 
water is also not captured in the IDP and 
ISRDP documents.
Concerns over water scarcity appear 
to have gained prominence following the 
recent development of platinum mining 
in the eastern rim of the district and since 
moves by the government, private and non-
governmental agencies to promote entry by 
black farmers into commercialised irrigation 
farming. Envisaged increases in the demand 
for water from the small-scale irrigation 
farming and mining sectors have given rise to 
intense inter-sectoral competition over water 
(Farolfi & Perret 2002). This competition 
appears to have prompted some government 
officials and scholars to argue that productive 
water should be re-allocated on the basis 
of efficiency, amongst other criteria. It is 
doubtful that such commoditisation of water 
contributes towards alleviating rural poverty 
in the Greater Sekhukhune District [described 
in Chapter 1 of this report]. 
Indeed the commoditisation of water 
seems to have particularly dire implications 
for the unfolding programme to promote 
BEE through the commercialisation of 
small-scale irrigation schemes. Recognising 
this, the DWAF has recently adopted the 
Policy on Financial Assistance to Resource 
Poor Irrigation Farmers as a means towards 
ensuring access to water by these farmers. 
Despite the adoption of this policy, however, 
there is a danger that the use of economic 
measures of efficiency in performance 
evaluations of emerging farmers might 
result in a reversal of their livelihood gains. 
Performance evaluations should therefore 
take into account the possibility that not all 
the irrigation farmers can or will become 
fully-fledged commercial farmers, and build 
livelihood sustainability measures into the 
evaluation process. 
Land issues
According to the ISRDP documents for 
Greater Sekhukhune, land reform is critical 
to the realisation of ISRDP targets in the 
poverty node. Although the district is viewed 
as having a high agricultural potential, 
70% of the farmers, mostly black, are 
‘subsistence farmers’ (Greater Sekhukhune 
Cross-Border District Municipality 2002). 
Of these, 30.4% have access to land outside 
of their small homestead plots (Stats 
SA 2002). Land use in three of the five 
constituent local municipalities remains 
dominated by commercial farming areas. 
The legacy of inequitable allocation of land 
therefore persists in Greater Sekhukhune, 
and 25% of the total land area has been 
subject to land claims (Greater Sekhukhune 
Cross-Border District Municipality 2002). 
Most of these claims are from Greater 
Groblersdal, Greater Marble Hall and 
Greater Tubatse local municipalities, which 
have significant proportions of land under 
white commercial farming. Black farmers 
in the Nebo Region of the district describe 
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land redistribution as ‘a burning issue’ and 
perceive the LRAD programme as having 
fallen far short of expectations, due to an 
impasse in the processing of applications 
from prospective entrants into commercial 
production. According to the DLA, this is 
because much of the farmland identified 
by applicants is subject to unresolved land 
claims. It is perhaps worth noting that most 
of the identified farmland is located in the 
Mpumalanga portion of the cross-border 
district municipality, while the applicants are 
mostly from the Limpopo Province, where 
most of the district’s communal areas are 
located.
While the commercial farming areas 
are subject to land claims and calls for land 
redistribution, residents of areas under 
communal tenure experience problems of 
tenure insecurity. Claassens (2001), for 
example, documents tenure insecurity within 
the Rakgwadi area in which the Upper Arabie 
Scheme is located. Land tenure insecurity 
seems largely a consequence of past apartheid 
practices which gave chiefs more power 
over land than they had under traditional 
systems of government, and the subsequent 
abuse of that power by some of the chiefs. 
Although the Communal Land Rights Act of 
2004 is intended to strengthen the security 
of communal tenure, how effective this 
instrument is, has been subject to ongoing 
criticism. Some of the criticism has revolved 
around the negative implications of the Act 
for the more vulnerable groups, particularly 
women, and the possible reversal of power 
and equity gains conferred by the post-
1994 National Constitution (Parliamentary 
hearings on the Communal Lands Rights Bill, 
November 2003). 
Land- and water-related challenges to 
commercialised small-scale irrigation farming 
in Greater Sekhukhune raise questions about 
the extent to which this form of intervention 
can contribute to enhancing the livelihoods of 
rural people. In addition to providing secure 
land tenure, water access rights, technical 
skills and managerial support, small-scale 
irrigation farmer development needs to take 
into account the multiple realities, needs 
and aspirations of black farmers, and to give 
particular attention to the poorest and most 
vulnerable people within the schemes.
 
Joint ventures 
Joint ventures within the selected sites 
provide a useful context for examining the 
ways in which the difficulties pertaining to 
land rights and access to water have been 
grappled with in attempts to commercialise 
small-scale irrigation farming. The 
predominant type of joint venture in 
emerging small-scale irrigation schemes in 
Greater Sekhukhune is contract farming. 
Mayson (2004) defines this type of joint 
venture as an agreement between small-scale 
farmers and processing or marketing firms, 
in which farmers commit to supplying an 
agreed quantity of goods of a special quality. 
In exchange, the farmers receive payment 
for produce as well as support with credit, 
training and extension services, production 
machinery and other resources. The activities 
of the joint ventures associated with emerging 
small-scale irrigation farmers in Greater 
Sekhukhune include joint production, agri-
processing and marketing initiatives. 
Joint ventures in small-scale irrigation 
schemes are not a new phenomenon in the 
Sekhukhune region. In both the commercial 
and communal farming areas, farmers 
have experiences of joint ventures prior 
to 1994. A common refrain in farmers’ 
accounts is dissatisfaction with the way in 
which joint ventures were implemented. 
Problems include private investors’ lack of 
transparency and accountability, a sense of 
disempowerment among irrigation farmers 
and the ultimate failure of the joint ventures, 
resulting in losses of livelihoods and assets. 
The selected case-study sites for this report 
provide insights on the degree to which the 
contemporary approach to joint ventures has 
taken into account the historical experiences 
of small-scale farmers. 
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Nested within the gap between the Olifants River and the eastern margins of the small town of 
Groblersdal, south of the R33 road to 
Stoffberg, is a cluster of small-holdings 
whose most obvious defining features are 
the numerous tobacco-curing barns that 
tower over a series of squat cottages in 
varying states of repair and disrepair (Figure 
3). A patchwork quilt of ploughed fields, 
flourishing gardens and fallow land is spread 
out among the cottages and barns. Closer 
scrutiny might reveal sprinklers quietly 
humming away and people labouring and 
gradually embroidering changes to the 
mosaic of the landscape (Figure 4). This is 
the Hereford Irrigation Scheme, a small-scale 
irrigation scheme that was revived by black 
farmers in 1997. What this idyllic vista does 
not reveal are the historical and ongoing 
contestations over land and water resources, 
as well as the changing partnerships between 
the resource-poor irrigation farmers and the 
private sector. 
The Hereford Irrigation Scheme provides 
an interesting study of the dynamics that have 
emerged in the historically white commercial 
farming areas following the implementation 
of BEE in agriculture. Joint ventures provide 
one important context for examining the 
impacts of these dynamics on the livelihoods 
of resource-poor irrigation farmers. This 
Chapter 3: Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme
The Hereford Irrigation Scheme is the focus of this chapter. Plagued by 
contestations over land and water resources, as well as the changing 
partnerships between the resource-poor irrigation farmers and the private 
sector, the Hereford Irrigation Scheme offers an interesting study of the 
dynamics and power struggles that have emerged in the historically white 
commercial farming areas following the implementation of ‘black economic 
empowerment’ in agriculture.
chapter gives an account of the issues 
surrounding the joint ventures that have been 
promoted within the Scheme. 
The Hereford Irrigation Scheme is situated 
on portions 236, 237, 238 and 239 of 53JS 
Loskop South Farm along the Olifants River 
and the Hereford Canal (see Figure 1). The 
scheme is sited at an altitude of 1 000m, 
approximately 44km downstream of the 
Loskop Dam at an altitude of 1 300m. The 
scheme is located within the commercial 
farming area administered by the Hereford 
Irrigation Board, in the Greater Groblersdal 
Local Municipality of Greater Sekhukhune 
District. The Hereford Irrigation Scheme 
occupies a total area of 192.19ha within 
the approximately 2 140ha managed by the 
Hereford Irrigation Board. 
History prior to land 
‘reclamation’
The commercial farming area along the 
Hereford Canal, presently managed by the 
Hereford Irrigation Board, was proclaimed 
in 1926 in terms of the Irrigation and 
Conservation of Water Act 12 of 1912 
(Tren & Schur 2000). Private landowners 
established irrigation farming following the 
construction of a small weir and a canal by 
two farmers, Meissner and Beukes. After the 
Second World War, following the accession 
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Figure 3: Panoramic view of the scheme
Figure 4: Close-up of a tobacco curing barn, cottage, chicken coop and garden
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of the National Party government in 1948, 
the Hereford area was developed as a welfare 
settlement scheme for white workers who 
were pensioned early from mines and other 
industrial sectors (Butler 1994). These 
workers were among the National Party’s 
key constituencies (Kruger 2001:2). Portions 
236 to 239 of 53JS Loskop South farm, in 
which the Hereford Irrigation Scheme is 
located, were developed by the government 
specifically as a white settlement scheme 
for soldiers returning from the war. These 
war veterans-cum-tenant farmers abandoned 
the land in the 1980s for a number of 
reasons, including the failure of a tobacco 
farming joint venture and insecurity due 
to anti-apartheid activism. Deprived of 
gainful employment, the scheme’s black 
farm workers were compelled to relocate to 
Tafelkop and Motetema settlements, between 
10 and 15km north-east of Groblersdal. 
For ten years the land lay fallow and 
infrastructure was vandalised and became 
dilapidated. 
Non-violent occupation 
On 1 February 1997, a group of 32 black 
farmers invaded and occupied the unused 
state land within portions 236 to 239 of 
53JS Loskop South Farm. The farmers 
were members of the Tafelkop Farmers’ 
Association (TFA), currently consisting of 
more than 800 members. Most of the 32 
farmers who invaded Hereford had spent 
their childhoods working on the Hereford 
smallholdings alongside their parents. 
The black small-scale farmers’ interests in 
the four portions of 53JS Loskop South farm 
related primarily to the availability of water 
for irrigation, the possibility of secure tenure 
on arable land, as well as access to funds to 
buy tractors and other agricultural inputs. The 
opportunities to generate livelihoods through 
farming in the impoverished communal lands 
around Tafelkop and Motetema had been 
very limited, and poverty and food insecurity 
was rife. These constraints and hardships, 
however, were not the principal motivations 
for invading the land.
The main reason for the farmers’ invasion 
was that in 1993, a group of black small-
scale farmers from Tafelkop had been given 
agricultural training and promised settlement 
on the vacant farm, as part of a pilot project 
of the Mpumalanga Provincial Department 
of Agriculture. The farmers heard nothing 
about the pilot until, four years later, in 1997 a 
sign was erected on the farm indicating that it 
had been sold. This prompted the farmers to 
invade and forcibly occupy the land. 
After the invasion, there was heated 
debate over the legitimacy of the occupation. 
All the relevant stakeholders, including the 
NDA, the DLA, the NDPW, the Groblersdal 
Resettlement Committee, the Groblersdal 
Civic Association, the ANC Youth League, 
the Groblersdal Taxi Association and local 
traditional leaders (diKgoshi), agreed at 
a meeting that the invasion was justified.1 
The Hereford Irrigation Scheme was then 
established, the farmers initially referring to 
themselves as the TFA, but later changing 
their name to the ‘Hereford Farmers’ 
Association’ to distinguish the particular 
group of farmers from the larger parent 
organisation. The DLA then began a process 
to lease the land for a renewable three-
year term to the small-scale farmers, with 
the provision that land ownership would 
eventually be transferred from the state to the 
farmers.2 
The DLA prioritised this project under the 
name ‘Hereford Irrigation Scheme’. Since 
the land was not under its control, the DLA 
had to motivate for a transfer of title from the 
responsible department, then the NDPW, to 
the farmers. The NDPW was to transfer the 
four portions of land to the NDA, who would 
then transfer the land to the Mpumalanga 
Provincial Department of Agriculture.3 The 
provincial Department of Agriculture would 
then transfer the land to the DLA, for lease 
and eventual transfer to the small-scale 
farmers. The transfer process, however, was 
complicated by a number of factors. 
First, there was a stand-off between the 
farmers and the provincial and regional 
department officials, with the farmers 
refusing to speak to these officials.4 
Consequently, the DLA resorted to involving 
national departments and not the provincial or 
regional offices in the land transfer process, 
motivating the transfer of land from the 
NDPW to the NDA. The DLA also proceeded 
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to provide support to the farmers through 
a contracted consultancy, the ‘Mpumalanga-
West Consortium’. The NDA prepared to 
enter into three-year lease agreements with 
the 32 identified farmers, with an option 
for the farmers to purchase the land. The 
farmers then applied for assistance from the 
NDA’s Farmer Settlement Support Fund and 
received approval from the Minister of Land 
Affairs and Agriculture. This effectively 
would have been a duplication of government 
assistance. The then-Minister of Land Affairs 
and Agriculture, Derek Hanekom, was called 
upon to intervene in the resolution of the 
complexities that emanated from the process 
surrounding farmer support for the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme.
The Minister responded, firstly, by 
cautioning against further similar land 
occupation. Secondly, the Minister decided 
that the settlement of the farmers should 
be facilitated through three-year lease 
agreements, with the option to buy.5 He also 
wrote:
The National Department of 
Agriculture should not in any way be 
directly involved in the settlement of 
farmers, the leasing or administration 
of land. It just confuses matters. 
Agency agreements should be entered 
into with provincial departments 
or local government to administer 
leases or manage certain farmer 
settlement programmes. The two DGs 
should please meet to discuss the 
rationalisation necessary to locate 
the leasing function which is done by 
NDA in DLA. In the face of substantial 
demand for land, 5 hectares of 
irrigated land is a lot – the conditions 
of lease extensions should include 
performance assessment.6
The farmers accepted the minister’s decision, 
and gave assurances that the precedent set 
by the Hereford case would not be repeated, 
but that the other members of the TFA would 
follow the normal procedure of applying 
for land acquisition through the DLA 
District Office. A business plan outlining 
the proposed use of the land was then 
drawn up with the help of Africare, an NGO 
operating under a bilateral development aid 
agreement between the governments of South 
Africa and the United States. The farmers 
were to be granted the land on the basis of 
the anticipated lease agreements from the 
provincial DALA and the farmers’ business 
plan. 
However, the land transfer process 
encountered further problems. Following 
the Minister’s decision, title was transferred 
from the NDPW to the Agricultural Research 
Council (ARC).7 This created tension among 
the small-scale farmers,8 who were reportedly 
threatened by outside parties who claimed 
that the small-scale farmers had no right 
to the land.9 In addition, the small-scale 
farmers reportedly alleged that a ‘third force’ 
from the past was preventing progress, and 
that various political parties were actively 
following the progress of the Hereford 
project.10 Some key respondents describe the 
transfer of land to the ARC as a ‘suspicious’ 
manoeuvre by certain government officials to 
forestall the allocation of land to black small-
scale farmers. Some consider this transfer 
to have been the trigger that prompted the 
invasion and occupation of the scheme. 
It is worth noting that the rest of the 
portions of 53JS Loskop South farm 
– excluding portions 236 to 239 – then 
belonged to the Mpumalanga Provincial 
Department of Agriculture. This department 
motivated for a transfer of its portions of 
the farm to the ARC around the time that 
portions 236 to 239 were to be transferred 
from the NDPW, through the NDA, to 
the DLA and then leased to the small-
scale farmers. For some reason, the land 
transfer from the Provincial Department of 
Agriculture to the ARC included the land 
earmarked for the small-scale farmers.11 This 
meant that before the process of transferring 
land to the small-scale irrigation farmers 
could begin, it was necessary to reverse 
the transfer of land to the ARC back to the 
Department of Public Works. Consequently, 
there was a delay of three years before the 
lease agreements could be effected (Kruger 
2001). However, the inception of the LRAD 
programme in 2001 provided a mechanism 
through which the land transfer could be put 
into effect.12
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At the time of this study, the lease agreements 
entered into on 16 August 2000 had lapsed 
and since been renewed on an annual basis 
with the NDPW.13 The four lots of land, 
portions 236 to 239, of 53JS Loskop South 
farm had been surveyed, subdivided into 
33 plots and the title deeds registered at the 
Deeds Office in Pretoria. However, the land 
had yet to be transferred from the Department 
of Public Works to the Provincial Department 
of Agriculture and Land Administration, and 
the farmers had still to be formally granted 
ownership rights. 
Early phase of occupation 
The first few years following the occupation 
of the Hereford Irrigation Scheme by black 
farmers appear to have been marked by 
ongoing tension between the occupiers and 
established white farmers in the Hereford 
commercial farming area. During in-
depth interviews with the black farmers, 
respondents alluded to conflicts, mistrust, low 
levels of co-operation and exclusion from 
water governance by the Hereford Irrigation 
Board during the early phase of settlement. 
Piontek (2000) documented small-scale 
farmers’ experiences during this phase. 
Respondents linked their earlier problematic 
relations with the established white farmers to 
their lack of ownership rights to the land. The 
respondents also pointed out that the support 
from a few white commercial farmers in the 
immediate aftermath of the occupation had 
gradually evolved into a broader and more 
co-operative relationship with the farmers.
Land allocation 
The total area of the Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme is 192.19ha. Initially 33 plots were 
surveyed, although there are now 34 plots of 
land on the Hereford Irrigation Scheme and 
members of the association reserve plot 34 
for collective use. The remainder of the plots 
are allocated to the 33 farmers who make up 
the Hereford Farmers’ Association. 
There have been some changes in the 
composition of the original farmers’ group. 
There is currently one farmer more than the 
number of farmers identified during the land 
invasion, occupation and rights formalisation 
process and some of the farmers in the 
original list of beneficiaries submitted to the 
DLA in 1997 are no longer part of the group. 
In addition, other farmers have since replaced 
three of the farmers who occupied the scheme 
and attempted commercial farming (Table 2). 
According to the chairperson of the 
Hereford Farmers’ Association, the changes 
in the composition of the farmers’ group 
are mainly due to the failure of the replaced 
farmers to ‘demonstrate a commitment to 
the collective goal of becoming commercial 
farmers’. Several criteria are apparently used 
to determine the degree of such commitment; 
these include diligence in production 
activities and subscribing to the governance 
practices of the group.
Plot sizes range from 0.70ha to 13.79ha, 
with a mean of 5.4ha (see Table 2). The 
gender distribution of the allocated plots is 
81.8% male and 18.2% female. Farmers of 
60 years and older command the largest share 
(39.4%) of allocated plots (Table 3; Figure 5). 
Of this age group, 92.3% are male. The plot 
size allocation did not seem to be strongly 
linked to income, gender or membership of 
the governance structure, although the five 
largest plots are allocated to male farmers. 
Several factors seem to have determined 
the pattern of allocation that has emerged. 
The existing variations in plot size are 
inherited from the original demarcations for 
tenants of the welfare settlement scheme. 
One respondent explained that the pattern 
of occupation of plots had largely been 
determined by events on the morning of 
1 February 1997. The group had previously 
agreed that as soon as each farmer occupied 
a plot, he or she would hang up some 
‘laundry’ on a line outside to indicate that 
the plot had been claimed. Among the 
present plot holders, however, are farmers 
who are recorded as having been too afraid 
to invade the land, although they were part 
of the original group that had signed up to 
invade Hereford (Piontek 2000). Also, among 
present plot holders are some farmers who 
have replaced original occupants who either 
subsequently ‘left’ their plots or who were 
‘removed’ due to a failure to demonstrate 
their commitment to the collective goal. 
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Plot 
number
Emerging farmers prior to 2004 Emerging farmers in 2004 Plot size 
(ha)Name Gender Name Gender
F Matthew Mokolobetsi M Richard Kenosi M 5.15
N Spencer Mahlatini M Moscow Masuku M 6.02
L Phineas Sithole M Phineas Sithole M 5.37
T Johnson Mathake M Johnson Mathake M 3.78
V Timothy Mambazo M Timothy Mambazo M 4.9
M Goitsemang Pelotona F Goitsemang Pelotona F 7.31
A Kgositsile Boikhutso M Kgositsile Boikhutso M 9.01
B Bohutsanyana Modimo M Bohutsanyana Modimo M 5.53
J Refilwe Monageng M Refilwe Monageng M 4.88
K Thabang Raperekisi M Thabang Raperekisi M 7.25
SO Kleinbooi Sibanda M Kleinbooi Sibanda M 6.16
Y Kedibonye Motsamai M Kedibonye Motsamai M 3.79
Z Jorosi Mdluli M Jorosi Mdluli M 5.05
P Kereng Maphala M Kereng Maphala M 8.53
Q Jabulani Stimela M Jabulani Stimela M 9.09
RN Mosimane Phuti M Mosimane Phuti M 3.06
D Themba Shabangu M Themba Shabangu M 5.43
C John Dlamini M John Dlamini M 7.42
IH Freddy Molapisi M Freddy Molapisi M 1.94
H Tirelo Sontaga M Tirelo Sontaga M 7.05
CG Maria Thulare F Maria Thulare F 2.99
AW Nakedi Sebolelo F Nakedi Sebolelo F 0.71
UQ Paul Basimane M Paul Basimane M 0.70
I Mqeda Nkathazo M Mqeda Nkathazo M 6.38
W Kabelo Mabalane F Kabelo Mabalane F 2.79
TP Rapelang Ramushu M Rapelang Ramushu M 4.87
X Nkele Simelane M Nkele Simelane M 6.95
U Mmegi Ntoane M Reneilwe Mofokeng M 4.59
O Lethlohonolo Thupane F Lethlohonolo Thupane F 6.49
R Pinkie Dube F Pinkie Dube F 5.57
S Serobe Molapo M Serobe Molapo M 6.06
E Petros Mphuchane M Petros Mphuchane M 13.7
G Kgabo Letsatsi M Kgabo Letsatsi M 2.70
MI Hereford Farmers’ 
Association
N/a Hereford Farmers’ 
Association
n/a 2.79
Age group Male % Female % Total %
40–49 8 24.2 2 6.1 10 30.3
50–59 7 21.2 3 9.1 10 30.3
60 and above 12 36.4 1 3 13 39.4
Total 27 81.8 6 18.2 33 100
Table 2: Allocation of smallholdings in the Hereford Irrigation Scheme, 200414 
Table 3: Distribution of smallholdings by gender and age, 2004
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The farmers have formally recognised 
usufruct rights to the land through three-year 
lease agreements signed in 1997 by the NDA. 
These lapsed in 2000 and have been renewed 
on an annual basis with the NDPW. Many of 
the farmers are not clear regarding the exact 
status of their land rights, and responses 
on the nature of tenure range from ‘partial 
ownership’, ‘almost mine’, ‘not yet mine’ to 
‘leased from government’ (12%). It is also 
evident that the farmers are confused about 
who is responsible for receiving the land 
rentals. While there is general anticipation 
among the farmers that they will be granted 
ownership rights, the farmers’ uncertainty 
and distress is evident in statements such as:
We do not know what is going on. 
The leases lapsed and have not been 
extended. No-one is talking to us about 
where we stand. We have a problem.15
Socio-economic profile 
Emerging black small-scale farmers such 
as those in the Hereford Irrigation Scheme 
are often described as ‘resource-poor 
farmers’. From a sustainable livelihoods 
perspective, this can be interpreted as 
relating to a deficit in all or some of the 
five livelihood capitals. These include 
the physical, natural, economic, social 
and human resources required for living. 
Livelihoods are considered sustainable 
when they can cope with and recover from 
stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance 
their capabilities and assets, and provide 
net benefits to other livelihoods locally 
and more widely both at present and in the 
future, without undermining the natural 
resource base (Carswell 1997; Hussein 
& Nelson 1998). A deficit or poverty in all 
or some of the livelihood capitals therefore 
restricts a farmer’s capacity to optimise 
available opportunities and resilience against 
vulnerability-inducing factors. Resource-poor 
farmers are therefore those for whom a deficit 
or poverty in livelihood capitals detracts from 
the sustainability of their livelihoods. This 
section outlines the characteristics of the 
farmers’ households in terms of household 
composition, livelihood capitals and 
strategies. 
Household composition
The Hereford small-scale irrigation farmers’ 
households consist of people who speak 
various languages, primarily Sepedi (73%), 
isiZulu (15%), Setswana (6%), SiSwati (3%) 
and Sindebele (3%). Despite this diversity of 
languages, there seems to be a strong degree 
of social coherence amongst the irrigation 
farmers. While the observed coherence 
might seem to indicate that the farmers have 
gradually developed into a community, there 
are problems with attempting to delimit 
the boundaries of the group and establish 
Figure 5: Percentage frequency of distribution of smallholdings by age and gender, 2004
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the precise total population. In attempting 
to profile the population of the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme, there are difficulties 
with using the concepts of ‘community’ and 
‘household’ for a number of reasons. 
The first is the phenomenon of 
‘straddling’, whereby the farmers’ households 
have retained the use of homestead sites in 
either Tafelkop or Motetema after occupying 
the small-holdings within the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme (Box 2). The reason 
for dual occupation of homesteads is to 
optimise the available livelihood generation 
opportunities in the Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme while simultaneously gaining access 
to social services in Tafelkop and Motetema. 
These services are absent within the irrigation 
scheme area. The general trend is that many 
of the married women divide their time 
between working on the scheme and caring 
for children and elderly relatives in Tafelkop 
and Motetema. The more consistent presence 
of women on the scheme is often associated 
with polygamous households (6.1%), in 
which one wife – often the younger – resides 
and works in the scheme while the other 
– often the older – resides in Tafelkop or 
Motetema caring for younger children 
and elderly relatives. The more consistent 
presence of women in the scheme is also 
associated with elderly women with grown up 
children (42.4%) and with women who either 
hold land rights in their own right or who are 
the main breadwinners in their households 
(18.2%). Owing to the observed straddling, 
therefore, the definition of a household as ‘a 
group of people who share the same cooking 
pot’, often used by Stats SA, is not easily 
applicable. 
The complexity of social relationships as 
well as the interwoven links with the broader 
TFA compounds the difficulty of defining 
a ‘household’ and a ‘community’ in the 
context of the Hereford Irrigation Scheme. 
There is no clear-cut distinction between 
the nuclear and extended family living 
both within and outside of a homestead. 
Some ‘household’ members move in and 
out of the homesteads for various reasons 
at different times, while continuing to view 
themselves as belonging to the particular 
household on the scheme as well as one or 
more other households elsewhere. Others 
appear to be more consistently present within 
the household, although dividing their time 
between the homestead on the scheme and 
that in Motetema or Tafelkop. In a number of 
instances, farm workers are virtually part of 
the households, sharing food from the same 
pot and, in some cases, also sharing the same 
house. 
However, the transient nature of 
employment for many of the farm workers 
poses difficulties regarding whether or not to 
include these in the definition of households. 
Consequently, the study adopts the view of 
the household as defined by the respondents 
themselves. Mostly, these definitions 
exclude farm workers from perceptions of 
households and include nuclear and extended 
family members whose primary base is 
viewed as being within the particular family 
group, whether or not these relatives reside 
in the scheme or in Tafelkop, Motetema 
or elsewhere. Married children are not 
considered part of the households, while 
unmarried adult children often are. Further 
research will seek greater clarity on the socio-
economic position of farm workers. 
The population of adults (over 18 
years) in the surveyed households is 55% 
male and 45% female. This excludes farm 
workers of whom many are casually or 
seasonally employed. Despite the higher male 
population, and in spite of the tendency of 
many women to divide their time between 
Hereford and Tafelkop or Motetema, women 
are more visible than men in the day-to-
day work in the fields and gardens. This 
contrasts with the predominance of men in 
the allocation of smallholdings. 
Crop production
The main commercial crops grown in the 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme were tobacco 
and vegetables (Figure 6). These were grown 
within joint ventures between the farmers 
and private investors (see Chapters 4 and 5 of 
this report). Two of the farmers also grew 
cotton. Subsistence crops included maize and 
wheat. Most of the farmers (94%) grew crops 
primarily for commercial use and set aside a 
small proportion of their produce, particularly 
vegetables, for subsistence. At the time of 
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the questionnaire survey in May 2004, lack 
of infrastructure to access irrigation water 
on plots 30, 31, 32 and 33 limited four of the 
farmers (12.5%) to producing fewer crops 
primarily for subsistence, although small 
quantities of surplus produce were sold. 
These farmers have since obtained access to 
water as a result of the construction of a canal 
linking them to the rehabilitated storage dam 
on the scheme. They have now commenced 
crop production primarily for commercial 
purposes. 
Employment
Most of the respondents (66.25%) – and 
slightly more women (33.75%) than men 
(32.5%) – consider themselves self-
employed, mostly within the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme (Table 4; Figure 7). 
More men than women have full-time, paid 
employment outside the scheme. This partly 
explains the observed greater visibility of 
women engaged in day-to-day work on the 
scheme. Some (12.5%) of the resident adult 
household population are unemployed, while 
• Kabelo Mabalane (a widowed female pensioner farmer, 63 years old and the smallholder 
on Plot W): ‘My children, five adult unmarried girls and one adult son, and nine 
grandchildren remained in the Tafelkop home. I support them as they are all unemployed. 
They do get child support grants of R140 per child, but this can only buy soap and a few 
other things – the bulk of the support is from me.’ 
• Pinkie Dube (a married female farmer 60 years old and the smallholder on Plot R): 
‘My nine children, four boys and five girls, remained in Tafelkop. Two are married and 
two are working. The five younger children are still staying at home in Tafelkop and 
attending school.’
• Phineas Sithole (a 67-year-old male farmer with two wives – Maina (47) and Mercy (63) 
– is a smallholder on Plot ): ‘I have five children, three of who live at home in Tafelkop. 
The first born is married and the second born passed away recently, as did my second 
wife. Maina was the third wife. Maina manages the farming and works on the crops on 
a day-to-day basis, with the help of two hired hands. My first wife, Mercy, lives at home 
in Tafelkop and looks after my elderly mother and the children... Hereford is where we 
work, Tafelkop is home.’
• Maina: ‘I do most of the work on the plot. With the income and food we produce here, 
we support the family in Tafelkop. … I have no children of my own.’ 
• Tryphine Masuku (52 years old, farmer and the wife of Moscow Masuku – a smallholder 
on Plot N who is fully employed at a furniture store in Groblersdal): We have one 
girl child aged 23 who lives in Pretoria, looking for a job. No-one is staying at home 
in Motetema. On weekends, when my husband is available to supervise work on the 
plot, I go to Motetema to check if everything is alright. The problem with having two 
homesteads is the cost of commuting. One cannot commute daily due to financial 
constraints. Commuting takes money away from investment in crop production.’
• Freddy Molapisi (male pensioner farmer aged 75 and smallholder on Plot IH): ‘We all 
move up and down … My wife and I have three children and three grandchildren. She 
mostly lives with them in Motetema. They are not working, so we support the whole 
household with both our pensions and the income from this plot…’
• Refilwe Monageng (male farmer of 62 years and smallholder on Plot J): ‘Having two 
homesteads is not easy. We virtually live in Hereford, while two of our children live in 
Tafelkop, mostly with my wife (Johanna), and attend school there.’
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Male Female Total
no. % no. % no. %
Unemployed (no paid employment) 5 6.25 5 6.25 10 12.50
Self-employed 26 32.50 27 33.75 53 66.25
Fully employed, with wage/salary 7 8.75 2 2.50 9 11.25
Casually employed 1 1.25 0 0 1 1.25
Other (e.g. students) 5 6.25 2 2.50 7 8.75
Total 44 55 36 45 80 100
Figure 6: Crop production, 2004
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Figure 7: Percentage frequency of adult members of households by status of employment, 
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Table 4: Employment status of resident household members aged 18 years and above, 2004
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Elsie Maphala is a 30 year-old woman who resides on Plot P. The plot is allocated to her 
father, Kereng Maphala (76 years old). Elsie is the eldest daughter of the family, and has 
two children, aged seven and two, who live in the Tafelkop home with her mother. Elsie 
works in the informal sector in Groblersdal.
I work for a woman who sells pap and meat at the ‘bus rank’ [bus station] in Groblersdal. 
She does not pay me any money, but whenever I need food and soap for my two children, 
she helps me. Selling food at the bus rank is not easy. We make between R100 and R200 per 
day at the month-end. On a good day during the month, we make between R40 and R50. 
However, in the middle of the month, we sometimes get only R14 per day, which is the price 
of one plate of pap and meat. We then have to carry the rest of the food back home to eat.
a small number (1.25%) is casually employed.
The presence of unemployed members of 
households within the scheme indicates that 
the decision to engage in farming activities is 
not universal within farmers’ households. For 
some adult household members, living at the 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme is advantageous 
in terms of proximity to employment 
opportunities in the town of Groblersdal, 
located between 0.5 and 2km from the scheme 
(Box 3). The scheme is therefore seen by some 
as a vantage-point for accessing employment 
in the urban centre.
Income
The questionnaire survey revealed that mean 
monthly household incomes range from zero 
to R4 000. However, follow-up in-depth 
interviews suggest that respondents are either 
afraid or reluctant to disclose their incomes, 
and consequently tend to exclude certain social 
grants, payments in kind and remittances. 
Respondents also exclude consumed 
subsistence produce from perceptions of 
income, partly because they do not keep 
records of such consumption. There is thus 
a need for further research on household 
incomes in the Hereford Irrigation Scheme. 
One interesting observation, however, is that 
the households that displayed the greatest 
anxiety over incomes were those that were 
involved in the tobacco joint venture. 
Household material resources
Household material resources include assets in 
both the Hereford and Tafelkop or Motetema 
homesteads of each household, other than 
dwelling structures and other buildings. The 
rationale is that the household livelihood 
generation strategies in both locations are 
interlinked, with farming activities on the 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme considered as 
an extension of antecedent opportunities in 
Tafelkop, Motetema and elsewhere. Figure 
8 shows the ownership of selected material 
resources.
Although the small-scale farmers are 
considered to be resource poor, ownership 
of productive resources varies among the 
households, with some households having 
a greater concentration of material resources 
than others. While a significant proportion 
(57%) of households do not own any gas, 
electric, coal or primus stoves and rely 
on wood fuel for cooking, some (15.2%) 
own two types of stove. The latter group 
(those owning stoves) also own sewing 
machines (60%), tractors (60%), produce 
tobacco (60%), and have debts (80%) mostly 
between R5 000 and R10 000. Household 
communication resources mainly include 
cellphones (54.5%) and radios (54.5%). One 
household owned a television set, yet none 
had a telephone connection. A significant 
proportion of households (61%) own 
vehicles, mostly ‘bakkies’ (small trucks) that 
are used to transport produce to markets. A 
number of households (30.3%) own tractors, 
many of which were purchased with loans 
from the Land Bank. None own donkeys or 
horses for draught power, and 30.3% own 
cattle. 
Of the total of 27 head of cattle owned 
by these households, a single household 
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owns 51.9%. A total of 25 goats are owned 
by two households, one of which owns 
80% of the goats. Most (83.3%) of the 48 
sheep distributed among four households 
belong to one household. Pigs (27) are 
owned by five households, two of which 
almost equally share 77% of the total pig 
population. Chickens (97) are by far the most 
widely distributed, with household chicken 
ownership at 33.3%. One of the chicken-
owning households has a share of 20.6% of 
the chickens counted. Although ownership 
of livestock tends to be concentrated within 
particular households, only one household 
owns a relatively large number of more than 
one type of livestock. 
Although rates of livestock ownership are 
generally low, livestock contribute to food  
security and income for livestock-owning 
households. In one of the households, a single 
dairy cow provides milk for consumption by 
the household members as well as for sale 
to residents of the scheme, and the money 
generated from this contributes towards the 
purchase of a miscellaneous range of day-
to-day requirements for that household. 
For another household that occupies one of 
the smallest plots (1.94ha) on the scheme, 
livestock farming takes precedence over crop 
farming, and sheep, pigs and poultry are 
concentrated on the plot of land and given 
stock-feed, while vegetables are intensively 
grown in a garden of under 1ha (see Box 4). 
There does not seem to be a significant 
difference in household material resource 
ownership between the Hereford farmers and 
other people living in Greater Sekhukhune’s 
communal areas. However, if we compare 
the asset ownership of Hereford farmers with 
that of rural households in the whole district 
(Stats SA 2002), Hereford farmers appear to 
have made greater investments in farming 
assets than the average Greater Sekhukhune 
household. Hereford farmers also appear to 
Freddy Molapisi is a 75-year-old male, married plot holder residing on Plot IH. He was 
born in Bushbuckridge. He worked as a religious minister in Lydenburg, Burgersfort, 
Groblersdal and Hammanskraal before retiring and settling in Motetema in 1994. His wife 
and he support three unemployed adult children and three grandchildren. 
Molapisi rears 40 sheep, ten pigs and eight chickens on his 1.94ha plot. He also grows 
vegetables, mainly for household consumption, in a garden of less than 1ha. The household 
income derives from the couple’s combined monthly pension of R1 480 and the sale and 
consumption of livestock and surplus vegetables. Molapisi sells between three and four 
sheep per month at R500 to R550 each, earning a monthly income of between R1 500 and 
R2 200. In one month, he sold four pigs at R2 000 each, thus earning R8 000. Chickens are 
reserved for household consumption, and Molapisi’s wife controls their use and decides 
when to slaughter them. While Molapisi controls the larger livestock, which bring in 
cash income, the couple share the task of tending for all livestock. The Molapisis employ 
two workers and pay them a monthly salary of R550 as well as mealie-meal, a share of 
food crops and additional money after the sale of produce. Livestock makes a significant 
contribution to household income and food security and also contributes to the incomes and 
food security of the farm workers employed by Molapisi.
From an initial flock of five sheep in 1998, Molapisi now has an average of 40 sheep at 
any given time. For him, the Hereford Irrigation Scheme is ideal for intensive livestock 
rearing in that water and fodder (in the form of scrap vegetables from local commercial 
farmers) are abundant. In 2001, he obtained a loan of R10 000 from the Land Bank to grow 
vegetables. He has since settled this loan and decided to scale down vegetable production 
in favour of livestock rearing. His decision was based on the recognition that his plot is too 
small, the water is too limited and the risks are too great to sustain commercial vegetable 
production. 
Box 4: Example of livestock contributions to household income…
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have greater food security and opportunities 
to generate livelihoods through farming. 
A major threat to the farmers’ material 
resources, livelihoods and well-being are the 
debts associated with the risk of producing 
capital-intensive crops. 
Debts
At the time of the survey, the majority (71%) 
of households had debts ranging from R120 
to between R10 000 and R50 000, with some 
households (33.3%) having between two 
and four sources of debt. The larger debts 
(41.9%) were incurred mainly in order to 
finance the acquisition of commercially 
productive assets, such as tractors (owned 
by 30.3% of the households). Other debts 
were incurred in order to pay school fees 
(16.1%), buy food (9.7%) and set up business 
(9.7%). Households involved in a tobacco 
joint venture (57.6%) showed the greatest 
concern over debts (see Chapter 4). For these 
households, ‘debts’ ranged from R6 449.80 
to R22 328.82. The debts relate to a deficit 
in the repayment of direct production costs, 
and were not linked to costs of renovating 
the dilapidated cottages, as some respondents 
among the small-scale farmers assumed. 
The latter cost is funded through a social 
responsibility donation by British American 
Tobacco (BAT–South Africa). 
Water account arrears, which amounted 
to R281 165.00 in 2003, constitute the 
primary source of collective debt for 
Hereford farmers. Although the Mpumalanga 
Provincial Department of Agriculture has 
settled the 2003 water account, farmers 
have continued to appeal to government 
for assistance with the settling of water-
related costs. The Hereford farmers are 
likely to benefit from a state subsidy, worth 
a projected R2.2 million, under the DWAF 
Policy on the Financial Assistance to 
Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers. This will 
ensure that water prices are kept constant 
despite improvements of agricultural 
infrastructure, thereby ensuring that small-
scale farmers have continued access to water 
and do not incur large water-related debts.
Grants and subsidies might cushion 
farmers against the negative effects of debt. 
However, such assistance is unlikely to be 
sustained in the longer term. It appears that 
the production of capital-intensive crops 
within joint venture contracts creates debts 
that threaten the assets and livelihoods 
of small-scale farmers. This threat is 
compounded, in the longer term, by the 
requirement for users to pay for water at its 
economic value, which will become effective 
after the government subsidy for resource-
poor irrigation farmers ceases. This might 
pressurise small-scale farmers to produce 
high value crops using water-efficient 
methods in an attempt to offset water prices 
Figure 8: Material asset ownership by households, 2004
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and bank loans, or else to trade away their 
water allocations. An important question 
is: What are the possibilities of promoting 
a viable group of small-scale black farmers, 
who may or may not be integrated into the 
mainstream commercial production economy, 
without incurring the risks of debts? 
Vulnerability
In the view of the small-scale farmers 
vulnerability on the Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme is mainly associated with lack of 
clean water to drink (100%), natural disasters 
such as floods, drought, frost and strong 
winds (87.9%), loss of possessions and theft 
(36.4%), serious accidents (12.1%), serious 
illness in the household (21.2%) and violence 
in the community (3%). 
The shortage of clean drinking water is 
perceived by all the respondents as a major 
constraint to wellbeing in the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme. Although the Groblersdal 
Water Purification Works are situated a 
stone’s throw away across the R33 Stoffberg 
road on the northern boundary of the scheme, 
the irrigation farmers use raw irrigation 
water diverted from the Hereford Canal 
for drinking and other domestic purposes. 
A water purification plant that was installed 
in 1997 has since broken down. The Hereford 
Irrigation Board has recently constructed 
sluice gates and storage tanks to provide 
domestic water to the small-scale farmers 
until a more acceptable and permanent 
solution can be found. The threat of water-
borne disease is a common concern for all the 
households, and farmers have yet to submit 
an application for the supply of potable water 
to the Greater Groblersdal local municipality.
Natural disasters such as floods, drought, 
frost and strong winds are viewed by 
a significant proportion (87.9%) of farmers 
as contributing to vulnerability. The floods 
alluded to mainly relate to the flooding of the 
Olifants River and its vicinity in 2000. This 
resulted in damage to crops and infrastructure 
and left farmers in the area feeling insecure. 
Feelings of vulnerability regarding droughts 
are mainly a consequence of the low rainfall 
over recent years. Frosts and strong winds 
are less common, but nonetheless impact 
negatively, particularly on the vegetable 
crops produced. 
Crime is mainly associated with theft of 
possessions. More than a third of households 
have been exposed to such crime. Some 
women expressed their anxiety about having 
to commute between the irrigation scheme 
Figure 9: Frequency of disclosed illness in Hereford Irrigation Scheme households
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and homesteads in Tafelkop and Motetema, 
since absence from either homestead 
leaves property exposed to theft. Straddling 
therefore creates difficulties in securing 
household material assets. 
Serious illness is present in approximately 
a fifth of the households. Disclosed illnesses 
include bad coughs, colds and flu, heart 
disease, high blood pressure, diabetes, asthma 
and diarrhoeal diseases (Figure 9). HIV/Aids 
is not reported in any of the households, 
although there is universal awareness of the 
prevalence of HIV/Aids and the way in which 
it is contracted. Ailing household members 
mostly reside in homesteads in Tafelkop and 
Motetema.
Fear of violence in the community affects 
only one of the 33 households on the scheme. 
The issue seems to be a sensitive one as 
the respondent was reluctant to discuss 
the details. There is evidently less fear of 
violence now than during the earlier phases 
of occupation, when tensions between black 
and white farmers were high.
Shortage of irrigation water
Shortage of irrigation water is a major 
constraint to crop production. The small-
scale farmers irrigate their crops for a limited 
time, three days per week, taking turns to 
access their share of available water. Water 
use is monitored by one of the farmers, who 
also acts as a pump attendant. The crops are 
sometimes subject to water stress, which 
impacts negatively on the quantity and 
quality of produce. 
Of the 192.2ha in the scheme, the 
Hereford Irrigation Board allocates water 
sufficient to irrigate 160ha (or 83.2%) of the 
area. This allocation is according to the terms 
of a water allocation system that applies to 
all farms under the Board’s management, 
whereby all farmers along the Hereford 
Canal were allocated 7 200 cubic metres/
ha/year, which covers the requirements of 
80% of each hectare on a farm. However, at 
the time of this study, less than half of the 
160ha was actually under irrigation. The 
shortage of irrigation water is largely due to 
inadequate irrigation infrastructure. Although 
the Provincial Department of Agriculture 
and Land Administration rehabilitated the 
water storage dam on the scheme in 2003 at 
a cost of R7 million, the bentonite lining of 
the earth bed has developed cracks which has 
resulted in increased rates of seepage. Repairs 
to the dam are under way.
A greater portion of water loss, however, 
is from the unlined section of the Hereford 
Canal. The canal begins at the Loskop Dam 
on the upper reaches of the Olifants River and 
stretches for 44km before discharging water 
back into the river. The upper 17km of the 
canal are unlined, while the lower 27km are 
lined with concrete. The Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme is situated below the unlined section 
of the canal. Prior to the recent concrete 
lining of the lower 27km of the canal, 
seepage rates were high and the estimated 
water loss was 60%. The persisting water 
loss of 30%, reported by key respondents 
during in-depth interviews, is largely due to 
excessive seepage in the unlined 17km of 
the canal. Ground-truthing revealed fields 
and access roads that had been inundated 
by water from the canal There were also 
massive stands of Queen of the night (Cereus 
jamacaru DC), a declared invasive plant 
species, growing along parts of the unlined 
canal. 
Although water loss affects most of 
the farmers along the Hereford Canal, 
particularly those below the unlined 
section, small-scale irrigation farmers on 
the Hereford Irrigation Scheme appear to 
be more vulnerable than established white 
farmers. The latter have larger landholdings 
and therefore greater water allocations. They 
often have combined access to between two 
and five sources of irrigation water, including 
the Hereford Canal, the Olifants River, 
the Loskop Canal and the Moses River. 
Consequently, they have greater leeway 
to manipulate and concentrate their water 
allocations to smaller parcels of land so as to 
irrigate their crops more effectively. 
The reasons for the farmers’ vulnerability 
are two-fold. Viewed in the context of joint 
ventures, the water shortage resulting from 
losses from the Hereford Canal poses a threat 
to efficient crop production and, therefore, 
livelihood sustainability. Given the basis of 
joint ventures on legal contracts, failure by 
the farmers to satisfy the requirements of the 
contracts could result in loss of possessions 
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and the undermining of livelihoods. Viewed 
in terms of the water sector’s ‘user-pays’ 
principle, the costs of lining the lower section 
of the canal could push up the cost of water 
beyond the reach of the small-scale farmers. 
These farmers already experience difficulty 
affording the current tariff of R802/ha/year.16 
According to the water bailiff of the Hereford 
Irrigation Board, the current tariff of R720/
ha/year [note the discrepancy] could rise by 
an additional R750/ha/year. 
One intervention that could reduce 
the threat of higher water prices to small-
scale farmers’ livelihoods is the Policy 
on Financial Assistance to Resource Poor 
Irrigation Farmers, adopted by DWAF in 
September 2004. In an effort to resolve the 
water loss problem, both black and white 
farmers have reached consensus on the 
need for emerging small-scale farmers, who 
use 4.7% of the total water allocation to 
the Hereford Irrigation Board, to apply for 
assistance from government to cover part of 
the R12 million required to cover the costs of 
lining the upper section of the canal. 
Between August and September 2004, 
the Hereford Irrigation Board and the small-
scale irrigation farmers lodged applications 
for government financial assistance to cover 
the costs of lining the Hereford Canal. An 
estimated subsidy of R2.2 million is required 
by black small-scale farmers, in terms of the 
Policy on Financial Assistance to Resource 
Poor Irrigation Farmers. This amount 
has yet to be approved by DWAF. The 
recently formed Mpumalanga Co-ordination 
Committee for Agricultural Water (CCAW), 
which is the relevant structure responsible 
for cases pertaining to agricultural water use, 
has requested written confirmation from the 
Department of Public Works that the lease 
agreements with black small-scale farmers 
will not be terminated. 
Emerging farmers in Hereford have now 
begun to be more proactive in relation to 
water access issues. During the early years of 
occupation the farmers resorted to traditional 
means to gain access to more water, and they 
called upon the assistance of a traditional 
healer to help them to pray for rainfall. Now, 
however, the farmers direct their requests for 
access to both irrigation and domestic water 
to the relevant water governing bodies. They 
have also demanded direct representation 
on the canal-wide Hereford Irrigation Board 
as a means of mitigating decisions that 
might render their livelihoods vulnerable. 
This development is complemented by 
improvements in the institutional framework 
for promoting access to water by emerging 
black farmers. 
Farmer organisation
According to the chairperson of the Hereford 
Farmers’ Association, the small-scale 
irrigation farmers derive their organisational 
identity from the Tafelkop Farmers’ 
Association (TFA). This organisation 
was established on 10 February 1994 in 
the Sekhukhune area by a group of black 
farmers from disadvantaged communities. 
The objectives of the organisation are 
to enable landless black farmers from 
neighbouring communities to gain access 
to land, use the land for business purposes, 
create jobs and contribute towards social and 
economic growth in the region. The TFA 
has grown into an 800-member organisation 
that transcends four provinces, namely: 
Mpumalanga, Limpopo, the Northwest and 
Gauteng.17 Membership includes men, women 
and youth. The organisation’s national 
office is currently based at the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme, where the chairperson of 
the Hereford Farmers’ Association is also 
the chairperson of the Tafelkop Farmers’ 
Association. The TFA is a constituent of the 
National African Farmers’ Union (NAFU). 
The term ‘Hereford Farmers’ Association’ 
is used formally to distinguish the 33 small-
scale irrigation farmers from the rest of the 
TFA. The Hereford Farmers’ Association is 
also closely linked to the Bakgaga ba Kopa 
Co-operative, an organisation for black 
farmers in the Sekhukhune area. 
Internally, the Hereford Farmers’ 
Association is organised into the following 
structures:
• a management committee
• the Hereford Vegetable Growers’ 
Association (HVGA) which is registered 
as a co-operative
• the Hereford Tobacco Growers’ 
Association
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• the Hereford Women’s Project 
• the Hereford Youth Project.
The Management Committee for the 
Hereford Farmers’ Association also serves 
as the Management Committee for the TFA 
and the Bakgaga ba Kopa Co-operative. The 
committee consists of five executive and five 
ordinary members. The Women’s and Youth 
Projects are described as ‘struggling’ due 
to lack or inconsistency of funding. Of the 
structures above, the HVGA and the Hereford 
Tobacco Farmers’ Association are the most 
closely linked to joint ventures in the scheme. 
Another structure identified by 
a respondent from the local office of the 
Provincial Department of Agriculture is the 
Hereford Irrigation Committee. However, 
the chairperson of the Hereford Farmers’ 
Association denies the existence of this 
structure. According to him, a proposal to 
form this structure was put to the Hereford 
Farmers’ Association and they had decided 
against it. Emerging farmers have been asked 
to form an irrigation committee consisting 
of members of the Hereford Farmers’ 
Association and represented in the Hereford 
Irrigation Board by one of their members. 
Drawing from their past experiences with the 
Hereford Irrigation Board, which consists 
almost entirely of white commercial farmers 
along the Hereford Canal, they perceive 
such an irrigation committee as furthering 
the white farmers’ intention to avoid 
transforming the Board, in contravention of 
the requirements of the National Water Act of 
1998. The Hereford Farmers’ Association’s 
contention is that a structure such as the 
Irrigation Committee will eventually become a 
water user association (WUA), which means 
that black farmers will be formally excluded 
from the Hereford Irrigation Board. 
Members of the Hereford Farmers’ 
Association contrast this exclusion with the 
inclusion in the Board of white small-scale 
farmers who previously occupied the same 
portions of farm 53JS Loskop South. While 
the conditions of inclusion of the latter are 
not clear, it is evident that black farmers 
have little trust in both the white members 
of the Irrigation Board and local officials in 
the water and agriculture sectors. Since May 
2004, the executive of the Hereford Farmers’ 
Association have formally expressed their 
dissatisfaction with being represented by 
a Department of Agriculture official on 
the Hereford Irrigation Board and have 
demanded direct representation by one of 
their own members.
This research was able to establish that 
a key underlying principle of the Hereford 
Farmers’ Association is to actively involve 
women and youth in commercial farming 
activities. The executive committee is elected 
by simple majority of all members in good 
standing at an Annual General Meeting. 
Funding is obtained through contributions 
of annual membership fees. Although this 
research involved collecting some data on 
the governance principles of the Hereford 
Farmers’ Association, further research is 
necessary in order to establish whether these 
principles have been formally adopted as 
well as the manner in which they have been 
articulated.18
Preliminary indications are that there are 
a few farmers who are dissatisfied with the 
power dynamics within the organisation, with 
concerns voiced over what is perceived to 
be a unilateral style of leadership that leaves 
very little space for individual voices to be 
heard within the group. There seem to be 
fears over voicing dissent, as well as fears 
that the leadership might know that some 
within the executive have taken initiative in 
communicating directly with the researcher. 
Thus further research will seek greater clarity 
on the power dynamics within the Hereford 
Farmers’ Association.
Rehabilitation and 
‘revitalisation’ of the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme 
Since the formalisation of the black small-
scale farmers’ occupation of the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme in 1997, a number of 
institutions have contributed funding towards 
rehabilitating the infrastructure and services 
on the scheme. Table 5 provides a summary 
of the direct financial assistance given 
by identified sources. Although there is 
significant expenditure on social needs, the 
biggest financial investments are related to 
water supply (for example, R7 million for 
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the dam) and crop production (for example, 
the post-settlement grant of R550 000 for the 
construction of a vegetable pack house).
Hereford small-scale farmers are evidently 
unable to pay for water at the present tariff 
and production income levels, as shown by 
settlement by the Mpumalanga Department 
of Agriculture of their outstanding water 
account of R281 165. The envisaged subsidy 
of R2.2 million towards lining the upper 
reaches of the Hereford Canal is envisaged 
to substantially contribute to keeping the cost 
of water affordable for emerging farmers. It 
has yet to be seen whether the government 
subsidy, and joint ventures in particular, 
will result in emerging farmers becoming 
financially self-sustaining enough to afford 
the cost of water. 
At the same time as efforts to rehabilitate 
the scheme, a number of activities have 
aimed to ‘revitalise’ production in the 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme. As individuals, 
smaller groups and collectively, the small-
scale farmers have developed complex 
linkages with other institutions and 
institutional actors (Figure 10). Some of the 
key institutions are involved in joint ventures. 
Linkages are with the following:
• individual white commercial farmers 
within the Hereford area
• Africare (Rural Enterprise and 
Agribusiness Programme) 
• Sekhukhune Farmers’ Development Trust 
(SFDT)
• Greater Sekhukhune District 
Municipality
• Greater Groblersdal Local Municipality 
(LED Committee on Agriculture) 
• Mpumalanga Co-ordinating Committee 
on Agricultural Water
• Hereford Irrigation Board
• ESKOM Development Foundation
• British American Tobacco (BAT), 
Tobacco RSA, Golden Leaf Ltd and 
Limpopo Tobacco Processors Pty Ltd 
(ex-MKTV): tobacco joint venture with 
Hereford Tobacco Growers
• Nature Choice Farms/ NFM Marketing 
Pty Ltd: vegetable joint venture 
with Hereford Vegetable Growers’ 
Association (HVGA)
• Limpopo Tomato Growers’ Association 
(information sharing)
• university researchers
• other local and international donor 
organisations.
There have been several joint ventures 
since the occupation of the scheme by 
Year Purpose Source of funding Amount (R)
2000 Surveying and sub-division of plots 
in sections 236 to 239 of 53JS 
Loskop Farm South 
Mpumalanga Department of 
Agriculture
60 469.56
2000 Construction of a canal to link 
plots 29, 30, 31 & 32 to water 
storage dam 
Mpumalanga Department of 
Agriculture
+/_1 500.00
2000 Drilling of boreholes for domestic 
water supply
Mpumalanga Department of 
Agriculture
50 000–75 000
2001 Grant for domestic electricity 
installations and training (no 
connections)
ESKOM Development 
Foundation
99 724.30
2003 Rehabilitation of storage dam Mpumalanga Department of 
Agriculture
7 000 000
2003 Settlement of outstanding water 
account 
Mpumalanga Department of 
Agriculture
281 165
2004 Post-settlement grant towards the 
construction of a pack house for the 
HVGA
Mpumalanga Department of 
Agriculture
550 000
Table 5: Key funding towards rehabilitating the scheme
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Hereford
SIS
Agriculture
Land Affairs
Water Affairs
and Forestry
Water
allocation
and supply
Commercialisation
Facilitators: e.g.
AFRICARE
Joint venture partners: Yukon International, 
Swallow International, MKTV, Tobacco RSA, 
Nature Choice Farms
Deltapine, Tiger Foods, Outspan
Seed companies: CottonSA, Monsanto, SAGL
Markets e.g. CottonSA,
NTK, Limpopo Tobacco 
Processors Ltd, local 
informal markets
Leasing
 Redistribution
L
Credit facilities
Local Authorities
Integration & co-ordination
 Research networks e.g. UP, PLAAS
Land Bank
State land transfer
Rehabilitation
Analysis
Public Works
Co-ordination:
CCAW
Subsidy to 
resource-poor
farmers
LED Committee for 
Agriculture
ESKOM
Electricity supply
Some established local 
commercial farmers 
ARC
Hereford Irrigation
SFDT
CBOs, e.g.: traditional 
leadership, taxi association, 
ANC Youth League
Lobby
Groups
black farmers in 1997, most notable of 
which have been those for vegetables and 
tobacco production. A number of less formal 
partnerships have also emerged between 
individual black farmers and established 
commercial farmers in the Hereford area. 
Summary
Although the emerging small-scale irrigation 
farmers in Hereford are classified as being 
‘resource poor’, there is some evidence that 
they are gradually increasing their livelihood 
resources. Gaining land through a process 
of occupation and (as yet incomplete) 
formalisation of tenure, the farmers have 
proceeded to use a variety of strategies to 
secure their livelihoods. These strategies 
are based, in part, on networking with key 
role players in government, civil society 
and the private sector. Joint ventures 
feature prominently among these networks, 
providing production skills, technology, 
management services and access to credit 
facilities and markets. The down side of these 
joint ventures is an increase in the incidence 
of debt in farmer households. 
What counts in the black farmers’ favour 
is the increasing strength of the Hereford 
Farmers’ Association in dealing with external 
organisational actors. This is demonstrated 
by the farmers’ pro-active measures to secure 
greater access to water through demanding 
inclusion and direct representation on the 
Hereford Irrigation Board and through using 
formal frameworks and structures to obtain 
required resources. The implications of this 
on the extent to which farmers’ livelihoods 
can be secured and enhanced have yet to be 
seen.
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Chapter 4: Hereford Tobacco Project: A joint venture in crisis 
The tobacco joint venture, known as the Hereford Tobacco Project, was initiated in 2001. The project 
was aimed at the ‘social and economic 
empowerment of small farmers to become 
independent tobacco farmers within five 
years’.1 The project involved 19 of the 33 
small-scale farmers in the Hereford Scheme 
and a consortium of three private sector 
institutions namely, Tobacco RSA, British 
American Tobacco (BAT–South Africa) and 
SA Gold Leaf (SAGL). 
According to an agreement between the 
farmers and the private investors, each farmer 
set aside at least 1ha for the growing of 
tobacco. The consortium of private investors 
was responsible for all project administration, 
including provision of production inputs 
such as seeds, pesticides and fertiliser, skills 
training, crop harvesting, processing and 
marketing, and payment of farmers’ labour 
costs and profits. Employees of Tobacco 
RSA carried out the key production activities, 
including ploughing, planting, cultivation, 
application of pesticides and fertiliser, 
harvesting, sorting and processing. Farmers 
closely watched these activities so as to learn 
these production skills. In addition, some 
training was offered through workshops and 
literacy classes. 
The farmers’ main responsibilities were 
to irrigate the crop at specified times, and 
Chapter 4: Hereford Tobacco 
Project – A joint venture in crisis 
This chapter considers the organisation of, and key role players in the 
Hereford Tobacco Project, which was initiated in 2001. It considers 
the impact of the lack of a formal written contract between farmers and 
private investors in the joint venture. Given the difficulty of establishing 
exactly what went wrong in the 2004 season, the final section of the 
chapter documents the views of different stakeholders, as expressed in 
interviews.  
to assist with weeding. Provision was made 
within the project for remuneration of such 
labour, which involved between two and 
five workers, depending on crop hectarage. 
Farmers tended to hire farm labourers 
from outside their households. Although 
the project provided for remuneration at 
minimum wage rates, some farm labourers 
appeared to earn less than that. Interviews 
with a few plot holders and farm workers 
indicated that the latter’s cash income was 
supplemented by the food they obtained 
through working on the plots. Such food was 
either produced or purchased by plot holders 
and shared with the workers. 
There was no written contract between 
the farmers and the private investors,2 
only a ‘nominal’ contract’.3 Nevertheless, 
all the farmers committed themselves to 
planting 1ha of tobacco for the joint venture. 
BAT–South Africa funded the project, 
SAGL provided management and technical 
expertise, and Tobacco RSA played the 
leading role – administering the funds. 
Tobacco RSA appears to have replaced a 
private tobacco growers’ company called the 
Magaliesbergse Koöperatiewe Tabakplanters 
Vereniging (MKTV), which was actively 
involved in the beginning of the project 
but had since filed for bankruptcy and been 
liquidated. 
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MKTV had worked with officials from the 
Provincial Department of Agriculture in 
providing support to the small-scale farmers. 
They did so through supplying funds for the 
operation of machinery from the Department 
of Agriculture, the camping allowance for 
the operators (government officials) and 
the restoration of the community hall on 
the scheme. MKTV planned to provide 
R3 million to cover costs of production, 
renovation of the houses on the scheme, 
provision of electricity supply to the 
community hall and houses and construction 
of tobacco sorting rooms, among other 
costs. As Table 5 in Chapter 3 of this report 
shows, electricity was supplied by the Eskom 
Development Foundation, although the 
houses had yet to be connected. BAT–South 
Africa provided a donation of approximately 
R3.2 million towards the renovation and 
construction of houses (R1 034 823) and 
curing barns (R686 610) and to cover other 
capital, direct and indirect production costs of 
the joint venture. SAGL provided extension 
and technical services, and Tobacco RSA 
provided the management and administration 
of the joint venture. There seemed to be 
a strong link between the future production 
and funding plans expressed by MKTV in 
the 2001–2002 season and the subsequent 
provision of funding by BAT–South Africa. 
In the 2003–2004 joint venture, BAT–South 
Africa, through Tobacco RSA, funded much 
of the activities and expenditure planned by 
MKTV in 2001–2002. 
The perception of some respondents 
was that after filing for bankruptcy, MKTV 
had re-emerged under a different name 
– ‘OBARO’ – and with links to Tobacco 
RSA and another company, Limpopo 
Tobacco Processors. This view seems to 
have been informed by the re-employment 
of MKTV’s employees in Tobacco RSA and 
Limpopo Tobacco Processors, for which the 
joint venture manager was a dual functionary. 
Moreover, the office of Tobacco RSA was 
located within the same premises as those 
which MKTV had previously occupied, the 
difference being that instead of ‘MKTV’, 
the signage of the premises had changed to 
‘OBARO’. The respondents interviewed, 
including the Tobacco RSA Manager 
for BEE Projects – cum-agronomist for 
Limpopo Tobacco Processors – could not 
give a clear explanation regarding the nature 
of the companies’ relationship. Nor could 
the respondents explain the process that had 
led to the dissolution of MKTV and the re-
employment of its employees in Tobacco 
RSA and Limpopo Tobacco Processors. 
Follow-up interviews with the senior 
management of the Tobacco Institute 
of South Africa (TISA) and Tobacco 
RSA helped to clarify the institutional 
arrangements. It emerged that TISA was the 
umbrella institution for all the role players in 
the 2003–2004 tobacco joint venture with the 
Hereford small-scale farmers. The members 
of TISA included BAT–South Africa, JT 
International South Africa and Tobacco RSA. 
Tobacco RSA, in turn, had ten members 
namely: SAGL, BAT–South Africa, Limpopo 
Tobacco Processors, Gamtoos Tobacco 
Co-operative, Swedish Match South Africa 
(Leonard Dingler & Best Blend), World Class 
Connection Trading, SA Nicecentury Trading 
CC, Universal Leaf SA, Dimon and Tribac 
CC. Within this institutional arrangement, 
Limpopo Tobacco Processors was directly 
linked to the erstwhile MKTV through 
having bought the liquidated company 
and taking over some of the MKTV staff. 
Because of the overlapping linkages between 
TISA and Tobacco RSA, the staff of both 
institutions performed dual functions at the 
head office level as well as at the local level. 
Further to explaining the complexity of the 
institutional arrangements, respondents from 
TISA/Tobacco RSA provided information 
regarding the problems experienced by the 
tobacco joint venture in 2004. 
A joint venture in crisis
The joint venture experienced a crisis during 
the post-harvest period from September to 
October 2004. The promised earnings had 
not only fallen far below expectations, but 
farmers were also said to have incurred large 
‘debts’. Tensions ran high. The realisation 
that earnings from the 2004 tobacco crop 
were far below expectations was a primary 
cause for concern among the tobacco growers 
in the Hereford Irrigation Scheme. The main 
reason Tobacco RSA gave for this failure 
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was that the tobacco produced by the small-
scale farmers had been sub-standard (of poor 
quality). This was due to a number of factors, 
including low rainfall, late season planting 
by Tobacco RSA and the inexperience and, 
according to one Tobacco RSA employee, 
‘poor management’ by most farmers. Added 
to these constraints, the small-scale farmers’ 
high expectations were viewed by Tobacco 
RSA as having contributed to deepening their 
anxiety and insecurity. 
A second source of apprehension was the 
information communicated to the farmers 
by representatives of Tobacco RSA that 
the farmers’ performance had resulted in 
significant ‘debts’ (see Column E of Table 6). 
These ‘debts’ were actually deficits resulting 
from the difference between expenditure in 
2004 on direct production costs (Column C) 
and the repayments towards the production 
costs (D) from the money received from 
sales of tobacco (A), less the payments to the 
farmers (B). Since the overall cost of the joint 
venture had been funded through a ‘donation’ 
of approximately R3.2 million from BAT–
South Africa, it is not clear how the deficits 
could be regarded as debts. According to 
TISA/Tobacco RSA, the conditions of the 
‘nominal’ joint venture agreement had 
been that expenditure by Tobacco RSA on 
the indirect socio-economic costs, such as 
renovations to houses, constituted a donation, 
but that farmers were responsible for the 
direct production costs. Without a written 
contract establishing the exact conditions of 
the financial assistance given, the differing 
views between the farmers and Tobacco 
RSA were not easy to resolve. Consequently, 
Tobacco RSA decided to write-off the 
farmers’ debts.
Table 6 shows that one farmer, Mqeda 
Nkathazo, had significantly higher net 
receipts and repayments than the others, and 
consequently had relatively lower deficits. 
The performance of this farmer is particularly 
significant when compared to that of two 
other farmers whose previous experience 
in tobacco production resulted in profits 
of over R23 000. The two farmers were 
among a group of four who were assisted 
by a white local tobacco producer between 
1998 and 1999. The white farmer taught them 
production skills and harvested and marketed 
the tobacco on their behalf. The black farmers 
participated in all the production work, 
including planting, weeding, application of 
fertilisers and pesticides and irrigation, and 
their tobacco was bought at the same price 
as that of the white farmer. In light of this 
background, some farmers expressed a view 
that tobacco bought directly from a black 
farmer is classified as ‘scrap’ or poor quality 
tobacco, while that bought from a white 
farmer is viewed as being of higher quality. 
Others suspected some irregularities in the 
manner in which Nkathazo’s account was 
represented. 
In the absence of a written contract for 
the joint venture, and in the context of the 
complexity of the institutional arrangements 
within this joint venture, it is difficult 
to establish exactly what went wrong in 
the 2004 season. The next section of the 
report documents the views of different 
stakeholders, as expressed in interviews. 
Voices from below: Oral 
testimonies of the emerging 
farmers
Refilwe Monageng – Plot J
Age: 62
Sex: male 
Married with two dependent children.
Education: Never went to school, but has 
since attended adult basic education (ABET) 
classes. Can read and write a bit.
Monageng has been growing tobacco in the 
scheme since 1998. He originally came from 
the Middelburg area and arrived in Tafelkop 
in 1973. He worked in Witbank as a driver 
until he lost his job in 1984. Since then, he 
has sold vegetables (which he purchased from 
commercial farms) and subsequently bought 
himself a tractor. For three years he produced 
maize on other people’s disused fields around 
Tafelkop. Monageng lacked secure land 
tenure and access to irrigation water, yet 
wanted to grow vegetables commercially. 
He was among the original group of black 
farmers that occupied Hereford in 1997. With 
his family, he went through the hardship 
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Key to terminology used
Net receipts: Amount of money received from sale of tobacco produced by the farmer.
Paid to farmer: Amount of money paid out to the farmer by Tobacco RSA.
Direct costs: Expenditure by Tobacco RSA on production costs (for example, seeds, fertilisers, pesticides) in 
2004. 
Repayments: Amounts deducted from the net receipts received from the sale of tobacco produced, to repay 
expenditure towards direct production costs.
Name*
Plot 
no.
A B C D E
Net 
receipts
Paid to 
farmer
Direct costs Repayments Balance 
due
Phineas Sithole L 9 122.12 3 192.73 23 841.25 (5 929.36) 17 911.89
Goitsemang 
Pelotona
M 16 922.43 5 992.85 29 360.06 (10 999.59) 18 360.47
Kgositsile Boikhutso A 8 383.25 2 934.14 27 179.93 (5 449.10) 21 730.83
Bohutsanyana 
Modimo
B 13 739.66 4 808.88 24 826.15 (8 930.78) 15 895.37
Refilwe Monageng J 7 610.15 2 663.55 23 214.06 (4 946.59) 18 267.47
Thabang Raperekisi K 9 353.32 3 273.66 20 420.78 (6079.66) 14 341.12
Kedibonye 
Motsamai
Y 13 318.30 4 661.40 27 767.06 (8 656.90) 19 110.16
Jorosi Mdluli Z 8 207.36 2 872.58 20 010.42 (5 334.79) 14 675.63
Kereng Maphala P 16 844.77 5 895.67 24 563.51 (10 949.09) 13 614.42
Jabulani Stimela Q 13 742.78 4 809.97 31 261.61 (8 932.79) 22 328.82
John Dlamini C 13 616.44 4 765.75 28 848.44 (8 850.69) 19 997.75
Themba Shabangu D 8 373.27 2 930.65 23 468.01 (5 442.63) 18 025.38
Tirelo Sontaga H 6 775.25 2 371.34 23 078.76 (4 403.93) 18 674.83
Mqeda Nkathazo I 26 474.50 9 266.05 23 658.23 17 208.43) 6 449.80
Michael Somkhosi W 13 772.78 4 820.47 17 437.07 (8 952.29) 8 484.78
Nkele Simelane X 14 488.14 5 070.85 31 691.25 (9 417.30) 22 273.95
Boykie Dube R 7 270.94 2 544.83 22 845.91 (4 726.12) 18 119.79
Serobe Molapo S 5 006.35 1 752.22 17 915.86 (3 254.13) 14 661.73
Petros Mphuchane E 8 247.86 2 886.75 25 145.85 (5 361.10) 19 785.75
TOTAL 221 269.67 77 444.34 466 534.21 (143 825.27) 322 709.94
Source: Tobacco RSA, 2004.
*Names have been changed to protect the identity of persons listed.
Table 6: Farmer accounts 
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of rehabilitating the overgrown plot and 
dilapidated buildings and turning both into 
a productive asset and a home. In 1998–9 he 
earned R23 655.22 from a tobacco production 
partnership that he and three other farmers 
had with local commercial farmer, Joppie 
Graham. When he joined the MKTV-led 
Hereford Tobacco Project, he therefore 
had had training in commercial tobacco 
production and processing. 
On the contention by Tobacco RSA that 
the tobacco was of poor quality:
Some time early this year, when the 
tobacco was thriving, we had an open 
day on which MKTV representatives 
brought the visitors to my plot to show 
them the crop. One visitor asked how 
much I expected to earn from the crop. 
I replied that I did not really know. 
The visitor then posed the question 
to the Tobacco RSA [Tobacco RSA/
Limpopo Tobacco Processors] BEE 
Projects Manager, who replied that 
the crop should fetch at least R30 000. 
However, I was very surprised when 
after the harvest I was paid a sum of 
just above R2 500. Yesterday afternoon 
[i.e. the day the researcher interviewed 
the Tobacco RSA BEE Projects 
Manager] two employees of MKTV 
came and gave me a little more than 
R100 and said that an amount of just 
above R400 had been deposited into 
my bank account. For me, these small 
amounts are a far cry from the R30 000 
that I expected. I am very concerned 
about this. 
     My concern is also due to that when 
my tobacco was ready for harvesting, 
MKTV sent its employees to come and 
harvest my prime tobacco. I was not at 
home then. They did not weigh it, or if 
they did, they never informed me how 
much was taken or how much money 
I had earned. So far, my earnings have 
only been from the ‘scrap’ tobacco… 
On assistance with renovations to the house 
occupied by his household:
When MKTV began the renovations, 
I and my wife had already started on 
the renovations and had completed the 
roof and some windows. MKTV then 
provided assistance with five window 
frames and panes, nine doors and 
door frames, floors for three rooms 
and all painting. My wife and I fixed 
everything else. The problem now is 
that MKTV employees keep saying that 
I should remove the roofing, and they 
will take my metal roofing sheets in 
exchange for their own supply to make 
it simple and uniform to the rest of the 
tobacco growers’ houses. This is my 
house, and I like it with its heaped roof. 
I have also refused to accept their offer 
of smaller windows. I like the large 
windows that I installed – they bring in 
more light and air…4
Pinkie Dube – Plot R
Age: 60
Sex: Female
Married with nine children, five of whom are 
dependants. 
Education: Never went to school, but can 
read and write a bit.
Dube was born in Steelport (presently within 
the Greater Tubatse local municipal area). 
Her family was forcibly removed from 
Steelport in 1961. She arrived in Tafelkop as a 
young unmarried woman (18 years old). She 
worked on the farms until 1969, when she 
married Goodman. 
Goodman used to work in Boksburg 
(Gauteng) when we got married, but 
lost his job when we had our sixth 
child. 
Kgoshi Rammupudu at Tafelkop allocated 
her a 2ha field where she grew maize. 
Because she had no knowledge of recognised 
farming methods, she used to get only two 
bags of maize. Then she met Agricultural 
Extension Officer Mr Mahlukwane, who 
taught her how to plough, plant and apply 
fertiliser. Subsequently her production 
increased to between 40–50 or even 80 bags 
of maize. She would then market her produce 
at a co-operative in Tafelkop. 
This is how I brought up my children. 
However, there was a problem with 
water. Our men then tried to find an 
alternative farming area and identified 
Hereford, where there was water. We 
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then invaded Hereford as a group of 
33 farmers. The place was run down, 
the fields overgrown. We stayed; 
persevered and transformed Hereford 
into the productive place you see today. 
Moving to Hereford was therefore 
difficult – not only due to the effort 
used to make the place productive 
and habitable – but also due to the 
resistance by white farmers.
On the issue of the earnings that fell short of 
expectations:
I have grown tobacco with MKTV for 
three years. From 1ha, I got R12 000 
in the first year and R3 000 in the 
second year. This year (2004), I got 
only R500 for three months of my 
labour on the 1ha field. In addition, 
I have a debt. I am not sure of the 
amount I owe MKTV, but the figure is 
over R4 000. The reason given was that 
the quality of tobacco was low. In my 
view, the quality of this year’s tobacco 
was better than that of the previous 
years. We have a photograph taken by 
Deon Meyer [Tobacco RSA/Limpopo 
Tobacco Processors BEE Projects 
Manager] some time this year showing 
how good our tobacco was. There is 
no way I can understand how I now 
owe over R4 000. I spent not more 
than R2 000 on fertiliser, pesticide, 
seeds and other inputs. I need to see 
the statements. Nothing has been said 
about tobacco prices falling … In the 
first and second years, we were told 
that we had made losses, but that 
these had been settled by MKTV. In 
the third year, this has not been done. 
Has MKTV shifted previous losses to 
the third year? After all the labour we 
expended on tobacco, we gain nothing 
but debts! I have decided not to grow 
tobacco anymore. 5
Kabelo Mabalane – Plot W
Age: 63 
Sex: Female
Widowed with six adult children and nine 
grandchildren, all dependent. 
Education: Never went to school; cannot read 
or write.
Mabalane moved to Tafelkop after forced 
removal from Maloeskop (where the local 
district office of the Provincial Department 
of Agriculture and Land Administration is 
presently located). A land claim for this land 
has been submitted, and the claimants have 
been assured of restitution. Before occupying 
the land in the irrigation scheme, Mabalane 
practised subsistence farming, growing maize 
in the land around Tafelkop. Her decision to 
move to Hereford was determined by water 
shortages in the Tafelkop area. Asked what 
had driven her, an elderly woman alone, to 
venture into commercial farming, she replied: 
‘Hunger. And the need to rely on myself, 
which I have done since my husband passed 
away in 1986’. 
On the issue of debt:
At a meeting in September [2004] with 
the Tobacco Institute of South Africa 
and BAT, we were informed that we 
owed a lot of money. Initially I was 
told that I owe R20 000 or R22 000 to 
the Tobacco Institute of South Africa. 
Recently I was told that I also owed 
over R8 000, but I am not clear what 
this amount is for. They also said that 
this would be recovered from the next 
tobacco crop, but we refused to grow 
tobacco again. We will instead grow 
sweetcorn and other vegetables [with a 
new vegetable joint venture].6
Phineas Sithole – Plot L
Age: 67
Sex: Male
Married with two wives and widowed 
through the death of one wife. Dependants 
include three children and elderly mother. 
Education: Never went to school but can read 
and write a little.
Sithole moved to Tafelkop following 
forced removal from Braakfontein. 
Before occupying the land in Hereford, he 
farmed maize and sometimes tomatoes for 
subsistence. Water shortages prompted his 
decision to move to Hereford. Difficulties 
associated with this move were mostly to do 
with having to clear the fields and make the 
place productive and habitable. 
We began growing vegetables like 
butternut, beetroot, spinach, beans, 
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tomatoes and cabbage for sale on 
the streets of Groblersdal and to 
supply local traders. Marketing was 
a problem. The new partnership with 
NFM will assist. They [NFM] have 
prepared the fields and will produce 
sweetcorn; imparting skills to us 
farmers.
On the issue of losses and debt:
We started growing tobacco last year, 
using hired labour that was paid [for] 
by MKTV. Although BAT assisted us 
with the tobacco curing tower and 
windows for the house, we had to buy 
our own roofing material. The harvest 
this year shows that we made a loss. 
The reason is not clear. We all have 
losses. The debts that we are said 
to owe are from renovations to the 
houses…7
Kereng Maphala – Plot P 
Age: 76
Sex: Male
Married. Dependants include three children 
and two grandchildren.
Education: Never went to school; can read 
a bit.
Maphala’s original home was in Tafelkop. 
Before occupying the land in Hereford, he 
was self-employed, repairing tractors for 
farmers in the Ramokgwebane area around 
Tafelkop. He had no tractor himself. At the 
time, his wife, Cynthia, was unemployed and 
did not do any farming in Tafelkop. Maphala 
moved to Hereford because he felt that 
repairing tractors was not enough, and that 
farming would generate more money. 
Elsie, (Maphala’s daughter), spoke on his 
behalf:
We grew tobacco with MKTV last year 
[2003]. We stopped growing tobacco 
some time in 2003 when the Land 
Bank repossessed most of our father’s 
productive assets, including two 
ploughs and other machines, to settle 
a debt that he owed. This discouraged 
him from further production. This year 
[2004] we did not grow any crops due 
to lack of money … We had enough 
water. Since the repossession of assets 
by the Land Bank, our mother has 
resided mostly in Tafelkop, caring for 
the home and children. Our father 
has been self-employed, mending 
fences and repairing tractors … More 
recently, our parents have begun 
to anticipate being part of the new 
vegetable production contract between 
the 15 members of the Hereford 
Vegetable Growers’ Association 
(HVGA) and NFA.8
Other local voices 
Projects Officer 
Mpumalanga Provincial Department of 
Agriculture and Land Administration (Local 
Office)
The tobacco joint venture is having 
serious problems. The current crisis 
should be viewed against the way some 
of the small-scale farmers have done 
in previous years. In 1999, before the 
farmers entered into a joint venture 
with MKTV, Graham, who owns 
a neighbouring commercial farm, 
assisted four of the farmers. These 
were Jabulani, Refilwe, Spencer and 
Matthew [Table 7]. Profits were very 
high. Jabulani got around R23 000 and 
Refilwe R23 600. The others did not 
do so well. This is what encouraged 
the other farmers to go into the joint 
venture with MKTV…
    I have tried to advise the farmers 
to grow vegetables that have high 
profit margins, such as paprika. I have 
arranged for meetings with companies 
such as Tygerbrands Vegetable 
Canners. I have also suggested that 
they should plant long-term growing 
crops, such as table grapes, oranges 
and macadamia on 4 to 5ha of the 
communal plot [Plot MI] and on two 
other plots next to it. For table grapes, 
for example, the capital required for 
production in the first year would be 
R150 000 per hectare. For the next 
four years, the production costs would 
be R50 000 per hectare. After this, the 
costs would become significantly lower, 
and the fruit would be harvested. The 
profits could be used by the farmers’ 
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co-operative to buy tractors and other 
inputs. Although the initial costs look 
prohibitive, a R3–4 million LRAD 
grant is possible. In addition to this, 
there is possible assistance by [white] 
commercial farmers.9
The insurance costs shown in Table 7 are 
relatively high (between 30 and 34% of the 
total production costs). This implies that 
tobacco is a risky crop. The concluding 
section of this chapter analyses tobacco 
production by Hereford farmers in the context 
of selected economic factors within the 
regional tobacco sector. 
Stephanus van Meulen
Local commercial farmer and member of 
the management committee for the Hereford 
Irrigation Board
A proposal was made to small-scale 
farmers to grow oranges or table 
grapes and vegetables, with subsidies 
from government and assistance 
from the white commercial farmers. 
Somehow, they decided to go with the 
MKTV tobacco scheme. From what we 
know, tobacco farming has never been 
profitable in the long run in this area. 
However, if the [small-scale] farmers 
could start with vegetables and then 
for the longer term, also begin by 
planting say a hectare of grapes or 
oranges, things might work out better. 
They could then increase the hectare of 
fruit according to what they can afford. 
The capital costs of establishing the 
orchard would be relatively high to 
begin with and the turnover would take 
a while – say four to five years – but 
eventually the profits would be higher.10
Marie van Niekerk
Commercial farmer formerly resident in the 
Greater Groblersdal area
We used to own a farm along the 
Vaalfontein Road between Groblersdal 
and Marble Hall, and have since 
moved to the States [USA]. We entered 
into a tobacco production scheme 
with MKTV, and it failed. The reasons 
for the failure were not very clear, 
although there was talk of reduced 
tobacco prices. As crime and violence 
increased in the area, with one of our 
relatives murdered, we ultimately gave 
up and emigrated to America…11
Gerhardus Booysens
Local respondent with links to the Hereford 
commercial farming sector
Producer Production costs (R) Total cost Receipts 
from sales
Profit
Mechanisation Chemicals Fertiliser Labour Insurance
Refilwe 
Monageng
1 750.00 3 751.35 2 719.08 2 018.91 5 040.00 15 279.34 38 934.56 23 655.22
Jabulani 
Stimela
2 936.50 4 817.43 3 769.50 2 626.72 6 804.00 20 954.16 43 982.40 23 028.24
Matthew 
Mokolobetsi
2 861.46 4 817.43 3 716.58 2 024.75 6 804.00 20 224.22 22 527.68 2 303.46
Spencer 
Mahlathini
3 045.00 5 349.51 4 032.00 2 183.26 7 560.00 22 169.77 17 368.96 –4 800.81
Total harvest per producer:
•  Refilwe Monageng: 34 763kg of tobacco harvested from a 2ha field and sold at R1.12/kg
•  Jabulani Stimela: 39 270kg of tobacco harvested from a 3ha field and sold at R1.12/kg
•  Matthew Mokolobetsi: 20 114kg of tobacco harvested from a 2.7ha field and sold at R1.12/kg
•  Spencer Mahlathini: 15 508kg of tobacco harvested from a 3ha field and sold at R1.12/kg
Source: Records of Hereford tobacco production, 1999.
Table 7: Farmer accounts for the 1999 tobacco growing partnership with local commercial farmer Joppie Graham
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The activities of MKTV in this area 
have been known for a while. The 
land that is presently occupied by the 
small-scale farmers in Hereford was 
abandoned by white tobacco producers 
due to failure by a production scheme 
they entered into with MKTV. MKTV 
is now under different ownership 
since filing for bankruptcy. There 
are rumours about the whole issue 
and it is not clear what exactly has 
happened. We have tried to advise 
the farmers, but they suspect that we 
just want to discourage them. The 
activities of MKTV really need to be 
investigated...12
Senior managers of Tobacco RSA and 
TISA13
On the issue of losses
Manager 1:
The losses were due to a number of 
factors. The climatic factor related 
to a dry spell and low rainfall in the 
last season. Planting was therefore 
done late in December instead of 
October. Most of the farmers were 
inexperienced, and hence did not 
properly supervise the tobacco 
production on the plots. For example, 
some of the farmers had gone off to 
do other business in town when the 
harvesting began. Despite all this, the 
farmers had unrealistic expectations. 
They thought that by simply going into 
commercial tobacco production, they 
would become rich overnight. Growing 
tobacco is not easy, and in the farming 
industry in South Africa, a farmer can 
often make a living but not get rich. 
This takes a lot of work.
On the harvesting of Monageng’s prime 
tobacco crop14
Manager 1:
We admit that mistakes might have 
been made along the way. We are still 
learning … Normally we communicate 
with the farmers through meetings 
where we inform them of what is 
happening and what needs to be done … 
We might not have got it all right and 
this is regrettable. 
On the issue of debts
Manager 1:
The debts have been written off. The 
debts incurred by the farmers through 
the 2003–4 joint venture were not 
the only debts the farmers had. When 
Tobacco RSA came into the joint 
venture, many of the farmers already 
owed debts totalling about R200 000 
to local input suppliers like OBARO 
and NTK for the growing of cotton, 
tomatoes and other crops. We paid the 
debts for them. They also owed a lot 
of money to the Land Bank who, when 
they heard that something was coming 
up in Hereford, also wanted to get 
their money back. We refused to enter 
into any arrangement with the Land 
Bank, and therefore the proceeds of 
the joint venture were in no way linked 
to the Land Bank debts. Even in the 
previous joint venture with MKTV, the 
farmers made losses. When MKTV was 
liquidated, the debts were also written 
off … The farmers’ debts were part 
of MKTV’s financial problems since 
MKTV had financed the joint venture. 
On the profile and status of MKTV
Manager 3:
MKTV Tobacco (Pty) Ltd was founded 
in 1909 and was the oldest tobacco 
co-operative body in South Africa. 
Over the years, MKTV played 
a lead role in the development and 
protection of the South African tobacco 
industry. MKTV was also a pioneer in 
marketing, modernisation and export 
requirements for its members and for 
the tobacco industry. The company was 
also instrumental in the formulation of 
tobacco-related statutory regulations 
and bodies. Due to a number of 
reasons, MKTV went out of business 
in 2002–3, and a new company called 
Limpopo Tobacco Processors (LTP) 
was formed.
On the way forward
Manager 1:
Since the harvest, we have had two 
to three meetings with the farmers 
between October and November last 
year [2004]. At the meetings, we 
tried explain how the joint venture 
Chapter 4: Hereford Tobacco Project: A joint venture in crisis 
48
Joint ventures and livelihoods in emerging small-scale 
irrigation schemes in Greater Sekhukhune District
works. However, the farmers wanted 
guarantees that they would not end 
up with debts if they went ahead with 
tobacco production. Of course there 
are no guarantees in the farming 
industry. It is a risky enterprise and 
therefore we could not give any 
assurances. As a result, 17 farmers 
have declined to proceed with the joint 
venture.
Manager 2:
Only two of the 19 farmers have agreed 
to continue growing tobacco. The 
rest have refused. The problem is that 
there are internal politics and conflicts 
within the group of farmers. Some lead 
others astray, and have influenced 
them not to grow tobacco. 
Manager 1:
I don’t think there is a recipe for 
success in joint ventures involving 
emerging small-scale farmers. If the 
small-scale farmers are willing to grow 
cash crops like tobacco, they need 
to be willing to work hard. There is 
also a need to manage expectations. 
A farmer can mostly make a living 
and not become rich from farming. 
We need to identify the right areas 
to grow tobacco without irrigation. 
Perhaps irrigation schemes are not the 
appropriate places to grow the crop. 
What is most important in our view is 
that there should be partnership with 
government and financing institutions 
in these joint ventures. In this case, 
BAT provided funding and Tobacco 
RSA provided project management 
services. Partnerships with government 
and financing institutions would lead 
to the development of proper business 
plans for the joint ventures. However, 
the problem for us at the moment is 
that government is hostile to tobacco. 
Hence there is also a need to change 
attitudes within government because 
tobacco can lead to the creation of jobs 
and to economic growth.
Key emerging issues
The views expressed in the previous sections 
point to a number of issues regarding 
interactions between the parties and among 
the farmers involved in the joint venture. 
These mainly relate to stakeholder and 
gender power relations and the problem 
of communication. They include variables 
such as accountability, transparency, 
representation, participation and monitoring.
Small-scale farmers and big business: A 
question of power 
Joint ventures bring together stakeholders 
with varying degrees of power and influence. 
Private investors’ power derives largely 
from their substantial financial resources, 
technology and market linkages. Although 
small-scale farmers’ access to government 
grants and subsidies, farmer credit schemes 
and networks with influential actors and 
structures within government and civil 
society give them some leverage, the 
farmers view their lack of land ownership 
rights as a significant setback. Low levels 
of literacy, commercial farming skills and 
access to markets also limit the power of 
small-scale farmers. The manner in which 
issues such as communication, transparency 
and accountability are handled gives a good 
indication of the balance of power within 
joint ventures. 
The issues of transparency and 
accountability are evident in some of the 
views expressed by respondents. In the case 
of Refilwe Monageng, lack of trust among 
the farmers resulted primarily from the 
lack of a satisfactory justification for the 
discrepancy between the judgement made 
on crop quality before and after the crop was 
harvested. What compounded Monageng’s 
lack of trust in the dealings of Tobacco 
RSA was the lack of transparency in the 
manner in which the crop was harvested in 
his absence and Tobacco RSA’s failure to 
communicate the details of the transaction. 
The significance of the discrepancy between 
expected and actual earnings that emerged 
from this transaction points to a need for 
closer examination of the procedures for 
interactions and transactions between the 
joint venture parties. 
Tobacco RSA’s interpretation of the 
absence of farmers like Monageng during 
the harvesting of tobacco as an indication 
of ‘poor management’ and lack of 
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commitment shows a misunderstanding of the 
communication and accountability problem. 
Monageng’s absence during the harvesting 
of the crop on his plot was a result of his not 
having been informed of this by the Tobacco 
RSA employees. Clearly the means by which 
Tobacco RSA employees communicated 
information about the harvest to farmers were 
not effective. Moreover, the manner in which 
Tobacco RSA handled the communication of 
this critical information does not demonstrate 
sufficient regard for the requirement for 
accountability between joint venture partners. 
The incident itself also demonstrates the 
implicit power relations between the farmers 
and their joint venture partners. The relatively 
weaker bargaining position of Monageng is a 
factor in the trivialisation of his commitment 
to farming by Tobacco RSA employees. 
The field employees showed no respect 
for the small-scale farmer’s need to know 
about the outcome of the harvest of a prime 
crop that he had laboured hard to produce. 
Rather, they behaved as if the crop belonged 
to Tobacco RSA, and beyond the labour that 
the farmer had already tendered and been 
paid for, the farmer had become expendable. 
The employees’ attitude contrasts with 
Monageng’s reference to the crop as ‘my 
prime tobacco’ and one of the senior Tobacco 
RSA managers’ allusion to ‘the tobacco 
crop’. Monageng’s case illustrates the need 
to clarify issues of ownership of a ‘jointly’ 
produced crop. A contract that also sets out 
the procedures as well as the roles, resources 
and responsibilities is clearly requisite. 
Without such a regulatory framework, it 
might be difficult to monitor and sanction 
non-compliance in instances such as 
Monageng’s. 
The communication problem is 
compounded by events that took place during 
the Hereford Project Publicity Day, held on 
the scheme on 24 March 2004 (TISA 2004). 
While the field day might have been intended 
as an incentive for small-scale farmers, 
it also contributed to raising the farmers’ 
expectations. Granted that the quality of 
the tobacco might indeed have been sub-
standard, the views expressed by Monageng 
and Pinkie Dube illustrate some of the 
unintended consequences of ‘show-casing’ 
a project. Management of expectations 
might, therefore, need to include ensuring 
that field days do not only highlight the 
good aspects but also point out the down-
side of commercial activity and give farmers 
constructive advice on how to address 
constraints. Clearly defined and broadly 
accepted performance indicators could 
be used in combination with appropriate 
accountability mechanisms. 
The Hereford tobacco joint venture also 
highlights the need for private investors 
to adopt appropriate communication 
mechanisms with farmers. Many of the 
Hereford small-scale farmers have low levels 
of literacy and some, like Kabelo Mabalane, 
are clearly confused about the financial 
accounting. Other farmers, such as Phineas 
Sithole, rationalise the confusing financial 
accounting by reasoning that the debts 
could have derived from renovations to the 
houses. Demands by farmers to see financial 
statements indicates an emerging lack of 
trust in Tobacco RSA’s accounting, and also 
points to a need to foster greater transparency 
in communications between Tobacco 
RSA and small-scale tobacco producers. 
The confusion about debts increases the 
farmers’ frustration with the 2004 tobacco 
joint venture and creates a profound sense 
of uncertainty and vulnerability. This 
uncertainty, more than the internal politics 
perceived by some in Tobacco RSA, led 
to the decision by most of the farmers to 
abandon tobacco production for vegetable 
production. 
Gender issues
Female respondents appeared less informed 
about the ‘resolution’ of the debt issue than 
their male counterparts. For example, Phineas 
Sithole knew that the debts had been written 
off from a meeting that he had attended at 
the Hereford Farmers’ Association building. 
However, his second wife, Maina, did not 
attend this meeting and was not party to this 
information. Ironically, Maina – age 47 – was 
the household member most actively involved 
in the day-to-day production of crops on the 
plot. The communication problem around 
the debt issue points to a gender division of 
labour and power dynamics within the group 
of farmers and within households. 
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Such politics seem linked to levels of 
individual and household literacy, the types 
and extent of social networks and access to 
bases of power and productive wealth. In 
the case of the Sithole household, Phineas 
is the registered occupant of the productive 
land in Plot L and therefore has access to 
meetings in which decisions are taken and 
information communicated. His second wife 
Maina has access to land through Phineas, 
and relies on him to pass on information from 
meetings. Hence, despite her relatively higher 
contribution to crop production, she is in 
a weaker position to influence decisions and 
access information that affects her livelihood. 
By contrast, Kabelo Mabalane is a 63-
year-old widowed female head of household 
and the registered occupant of land on Plot 
W. She therefore has access to meetings. 
While this might be assumed as conferring a 
degree of power, her lack of formal education 
is a major constraint on her understanding 
of financial issues. The dominance of male 
plot holders on the scheme, Kabelo’s age 
and the burden of responsibility as the sole 
breadwinner of a relatively large household 
results in her feeling more uncertain and 
vulnerable than many of the other farmers. 
Gender power dynamics warrant particular 
attention by the Hereford Farmers’ 
Association. 
Within the Hereford Farmers’ 
Association, although the organisation is 
purportedly predicated on principles such 
as democratic accession into the executive 
committee, gender equity, the involvement 
of youth, accountability and transparency, 
these principles appear to have been partially 
pursued. Indications are that there are 
gender power issues among farmers within 
the organisation. Although the Hereford 
Women’s Project is described as ‘struggling’ 
due to inconsistency of funding, the project 
does not clearly show how it will contribute 
to mainstreaming the strategic interests of 
women in farming activities. 
Studies by Van Koppen (2001), Bastidas 
(1999), Zwarteveen (1997) and Zwarteveen 
& Neupane (1996) suggest that irrigation 
farming is not gender neutral, but that gender 
roles and rights strongly determine crop types 
and levels of production and food security. 
However, although women often play 
a more active role in day-to-day production 
activities, their participation in decision 
making tends to be limited. In cases such as 
Hereford, where men dominate land-holding 
(Table 3) and decision-making arenas, it is 
important for the Hereford Women’s Project 
to have clearly articulated and actively 
pursued objectives that address women’s 
strategic interests. Despite its present 
weaknesses, the Hereford Women’s Project 
provides an opportunity for the women to 
mobilise greater involvement in decision 
making and access to information.15
Risk associated with capital-intensive 
crops
The small-scale farmers’ production accounts 
(Tables 6 and 7) show that tobacco is 
a capital-intensive crop. Direct production 
costs account for between 89% and over 
320% of the farmers’ net receipts from 
tobacco sales in 2004. In 1999, production 
costs per farmer ranged from 39.2% of the 
receipts from sales for the more successful 
farmers to 127.6% for the less successful. 
The insurance costs shown in Table 7 are 
relatively high, accounting for between 30 
and 34% of the total production costs. This 
implies that tobacco is a risky crop. The high 
risks involved, the requirement for substantial 
capital outlay and the losses experienced in 
successive tobacco joint ventures in Hereford 
raise questions about the ability of small-
scale farmers to sustain tobacco production 
without long-term financial assistance. 
The Hereford tobacco producers’ 
apprehension about joint ventures can be 
understood in light of the insecurity observed 
in the household of Kereng Maphala. 
Maphala lost most of his productive assets 
when the Land Bank repossessed these in 
lieu of a debt owed by the farmer. This led 
to his inability to grow any crops in 2004 as 
he waited to recover from the loss. However, 
this household might be vulnerable in the 
longer term, given that the total household 
income comes from the intermittent self-
employment of Maphala, his daughter Elsie’s 
informal working relationship in exchange 
for food and soap and the social grant of 
R340 for two of Elsie’s children (see Box 3). 
The widespread failure to repay loans 
within the scheme was identified prior to the 
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tobacco joint venture. The involvement of the 
Land Bank was linked to REAP, which since 
1997 had provided the farmers with inputs to 
the value of R54 052 on a no-interest credit 
basis through the government’s erstwhile 
National Agricultural Sector Investment 
Programme. A mere R7 332.10 had been 
repaid by 2000, and an evaluation of REAP 
recommended the involvement of the Land 
Bank in designing a scheme in which REAP 
could provide funds for on-lending by the 
bank to the farmers, with the bank monitoring 
repayments. It is not clear whether Maphala’s 
debt was linked to assistance from REAP. 
However, the recurrence within Hereford of 
joint ventures that provide credit to farmers 
and expose them to risk, debt and possible 
losses of assets and livelihoods suggests 
the need for interventions to break the 
vicious cycle of vulnerability and livelihood 
insecurity. 
Studies by de Klerk (1996) on similar 
farming schemes in the Western Cape suggest 
that adequate financial support is central to 
the success of any programme to establish 
small-scale farmers. In February 2005, the 
Minister of Finance announced the launch of a 
government-funded credit scheme to support 
emerging small-scale farmers (Business 
Report 2005). This has been greeted with 
optimism within commercial farming circles 
despite the fact that agricultural credit 
schemes for small-scale farmers, which have 
traditionally been an important component of 
agricultural development projects, have often 
failed. 
A critical factor determining the viability 
of farming activity is ‘gearing’. This is the 
degree to which farming activities are funded 
by a small-scale farmer’s own funds relative 
to finance through creditors’ funds. A ‘rule 
of thumb’ of the South African Agricultural 
Union (cited in de Klerk 1996:72) considers 
that farms with a debt of more than 30% 
in their financial structure are unsound, 
while those with debt levels above 50% are 
unlikely to survive. In the case of Hereford, 
tobacco production costs have often far 
exceeded 50% of net earnings, with much 
of the costs financed through a subsidy 
grant from BAT–South Africa as well as 
subsidies from government. Such subsidies 
are not sustainable in the long term, and 
farmers might resort to credit schemes to 
finance the production of capital-intensive 
crops. The high ratio between possible debts 
and net earnings will render small-scale 
tobacco producers vulnerable to downturns 
in the tobacco market prices. Losses of 
assets following failure to repay bank loans, 
exemplified by the case of Kereng Maphala, 
point to a need for caution in adopting 
credit schemes as a means of supporting the 
establishment of small-scale farmers. 
Following the failures of supply-led 
credit, critics have placed particular emphasis 
on the need to ensure institutional efficiency, 
sustainability of the credit programmes 
measured in terms of few default incidences, 
viable interest rates and the degree of 
integration of the credit project with the 
overall development of a rural financial 
market. In the wake of new institutional 
designs there is concern whether loans are 
used efficiently by borrowers, institutions 
meet farmers’ demands for credit, credit 
programmes enhance farmers’ access to 
market and whether they treat borrowers 
equitably. While these concerns call for 
further studies to evaluate credit delivery 
initiatives by development projects, there is 
also a need to examine the potential of credit 
to significantly raise small-scale farmers’ 
degrees of leverage, rendering their attempts 
at commercial production highly risky. 
Another source of risk relates to decisions 
to produce capital-intensive cash or industrial 
crops based on perceived opportunities 
within regional and global production and 
market trends. While this form of risk 
is typical of most commercial farming 
activity, emerging small-scale farmers are 
particularly vulnerable to possible losses 
emanating from changing trends. Hereford 
farmers’ decision to grow tobacco, despite 
this crop’s unsuccessful production history 
in Hereford, appears to have been influenced 
by the decline of tobacco production in 
Zimbabwe following the orchestrated ‘fast-
track’ land reform. The decline in imports of 
Zimbabwean tobacco by BAT–SA to around 
10% of levels of previous years has reduced 
competition from Zimbabwe’s prime quality 
tobacco and created a gap in supply. This 
has provided South African farmers with an 
opportunity for entry into the tobacco sector. 
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However, the broader market trends also 
show that Brazil has increased its output of 
prime tobacco, thereby claiming a significant 
share of the market. In addition, BAT–PLC, 
a major role player in the world tobacco 
trade, recently nominated Brazil, the United 
States and Zimbabwe as future major sources 
of tobacco.16 The future of small-scale 
tobacco production in Hereford therefore 
remains uncertain. Channelling significant 
investments towards capital-intensive crops, 
such as tobacco, that are selected on the 
basis of short-term opportunities will only 
predispose emerging small-scale farmers to 
the negative effects of debt and losses. 
Conclusion
Experiences in this joint venture show that 
black economic empowerment in agriculture 
requires that attention be given to issues of 
power, gender, accountability, transparency, 
communication and the risks associated with 
capital-intensive crops such as tobacco. There 
is also a need for support to strengthen farmer 
organisations so that they can engage more 
effectively and equably both within the group 
and with external role players. Emerging 
findings point to strengths and weaknesses 
in the governance of the Hereford Farmers’ 
Association. 
Strengths derive from the farmers’ pro-
active move to reclaim land, water and 
other resources on the scheme, and from 
their growing confidence resulting from 
support by government and other external 
role players. Of these factors, land provides 
the primary motivation for farmers to claim 
further rights of access to water, decision 
making and government funding. There are 
also strengths associated with the support 
given by private investors in the tobacco joint 
venture, mainly relating to the transfer of 
production skills to the small-scale farmers. 
All the respondents express an appreciation 
of the knowledge gained from the extension 
and technical services provided by Tobacco 
RSA. The mode of skills transfer is largely 
through direct observation and instruction 
in the course of production activities. There 
is also some training through workshops as 
well as literacy classes. Such skills transfer 
and education constitute key factors towards 
building confidence among the farmers. 
The identified weaknesses relate mainly to 
the management of power dynamics within 
the joint venture, the Hereford Farmers’ 
Association and, to some extent, household 
gender and age groupings. The Hereford 
Tobacco Project also indicates a need for 
greater attention to be paid to governance 
issues within and surrounding the joint 
venture.
Many of the views expressed by 
respondents outside of the Hereford Farmers’ 
Association echo the small-scale farmers’ 
observations of problems such as lack of 
transparency on the part of Tobacco RSA 
and MKTV, its predecessor. While the 
views of key respondents from the tobacco 
agribusiness sector indicate their greater 
clarity regarding institutional arrangements, 
it appears that no effort has been made to 
ensure broader awareness of the rationale 
behind changes within the private investor 
group, particularly the role and fate of 
MKTV. In view of the repeated failure of 
the project, such awareness is vital, given 
the attention and moral, political, financial 
and other support that the Hereford case 
attracts from a wide range of stakeholders 
and observers. The disparity in levels of 
information between people inside and 
outside the tobacco agribusiness sector points 
not only to a problem with communication, 
but also to a problem of accountability. 
A question that begs to be answered is: 
In a joint venture setting with so many 
stakeholders, who is accountable to whom, 
and who should play the monitoring role? 
The views of external respondents point 
to the importance of legitimacy and trust 
in decision making. The adoption of new 
ideas depends on farmers’ perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the sources of advice. Emerging 
farmers’ lack of trust in some commercial 
farmers and provincial government officials 
emanates from past conflicts and tensions, 
in which emerging farmers perceived that 
their interests were being marginalised and 
undermined. Hence farmers’ refusal to accept 
the advice of some commercial farmers and 
government officials to grow high value 
vegetables and tree crops. Yet they accepted 
the advice of a trusted white commercial 
farmer that they should grow tobacco, and 
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earlier that of a trusted NGO, Africare, to 
grow high value vegetables. The Hereford 
case also illustrates how the loss of trust can 
result in advice from a trusted source, in this 
case Africare, becoming unacceptable. 
Beyond issues of trust, the debacle around 
the tobacco joint venture is also characterised 
by political manoeuvring by the leadership 
of the farmers, who feel that as a group they 
have had to deal with more powerful actors. 
Although not fully substantiated, this is 
evident in the farmers’ choice of strategies 
and in certain decisions by the leadership. 
Some farmers consider the leadership style to 
be rather heavy-handed, while some external 
actors consider it variously as ‘bullying’, 
‘leading others astray’ and ‘rather too 
strong’.17 Such perceptions point to concerns 
over power relations within the group. The 
weaknesses, however, do not necessarily 
indicate failure but rather the need to build 
organisational strength.
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Chapter 5: Vegetable joint 
venture or ‘the “return” of the 
fugitive pack house’
A new joint venture for the production of ‘baby’ vegetables for 
the export market in the Hereford Irrigation Scheme in 2004 was 
identified as a possible niche for the small-scale farmers. One of the 
envisaged highlights of this joint venture was the possibility of realising a 
longstanding vision for a ‘pack house’. However, the process of setting 
up this joint venture seems to have been fraught with contestation, 
particularly with regard to the location of the pack house. This chapter 
considers how local decision making is responding to changes in the 
power arena.
Anew joint venture for vegetable production emerged in the Hereford Irrigation Scheme between 
September and October 2004. This involved 
a group of 15 farmers who had formally 
established a co-operative called the Hereford 
Vegetable Growers’ Association (HVGA). 
A business plan had been drawn up as part 
of an application by HVGA for government 
funding towards the construction of a 
vegetable packaging house, and a grant of 
approximately R550 000 had been approved 
by the Provincial Department of Agriculture 
and Land Administration. The farmers had 
also signed a contract with a private investor, 
Nature’s Choice (NFM) Farms (Pty) Ltd, and 
the latter had established a new company, 
NFM Marketing, to handle the marketing 
for NFM Farms and HVGA. The farmers 
in HVGA were to have a 25% stake in the 
Alberton (Johannesburg) based marketing 
company. The joint venture partners had 
entered into their first contract for the 
production and marketing of sweetcorn to 
retailers like Spar, Woolworths and Pick ’n 
Pay. Other crops to be produced included 
pumpkin, butternut and green beans. 
The objectives of the joint venture were to:
• produce ‘quality fresh vegetables’ 
to supply the local, national and 
international markets.
• process and package the vegetables.
• generate income from the project, keep 
it sustainable and use it as a support 
base for the emerging Hereford farmers 
venturing into the fully commercialised 
sector.
• create job opportunities for both 
the project owners and some of the 
unemployed people in surrounding 
communities.
The joint venture envisaged that the land 
resources to be used for production would 
include the entire 160ha of irrigated land 
falling within the Hereford Irrigation Scheme 
as well as the use of tunnels (greenhouses) 
on the communal pot (Plot 34). The total 
projected earnings from this joint venture 
ranged from approximately R4.5 million in 
the first year to R13.7 million in the fifth 
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year. These figures were based on production 
in tunnels and conventional irrigation of 
tomatoes and cabbages, at an annual gross 
profit margin of approximately R24 500/ha 
and R26 000/ha respectively. Implicit within 
these projections were assumptions that all 
the small-scale farmers on the scheme would 
pool their individual land rights into the 
joint venture enterprise, and that the water 
allocations and availability in the scheme 
would remain constant. 
Farmers’ expectations of success for 
this new joint venture ran high. One of the 
envisaged highlights of the joint venture was 
the possibility of realising a longstanding 
vision for a ‘pack house’ located within 
the Hereford Irrigation Scheme. Indeed, 
throughout my fieldwork in 2003 and 2004, 
the Hereford scheme was dominated by 
talk of the pack house. With the approval in 
2004 of a government grant of R550 000, 
this vision finally appeared to be coming to 
fruition. 
Vegetable pack house: Birth of 
an idea
The joint venture between HVGA and NFM 
Farms was preceded by a similar initiative, 
in 1999, through Africare’s Rural Enterprise 
and Agribusiness Programme (REAP) in 
the Greater Sekhukhune area. The initiative 
was part of a bigger project by Africare 
to promote commercialised small-scale 
irrigation farming in the Greater Sekhukhune 
area. Ten communities were involved in 
this initiative, which had four components: 
extension and training, marketing, water 
development and co-operative development. 
Following the decision to grant land rights 
to the small-scale farmers under the LRAD 
programme, Hereford Irrigation Scheme was 
selected as a pilot project to promote entry 
by black farmers into the highly competitive 
export-orientated commercial farming and 
agri-business sectors. 
Africare contracted Yukon International to 
conduct a feasibility study on 40ha of land in 
the Hereford Irrigation Scheme and in other 
small-scale irrigation schemes in the Nebo 
Region of Greater Sekhukhune. The initial 
assessment of the Hereford Irrigation Scheme 
showed that although the farmers had access 
to water and were well organised as a group, 
they lacked access to markets. The verdict 
of Yukon International was that a pack 
house was feasible, and that three high value 
vegetable crops that could be produced were 
courgettes, baby cauliflowers and paprika. 
Consequently, plans were drawn up for the 
construction of a pack house on the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme.
In an attempt to address the farmers’ 
need, Africare facilitated the formation of 
a joint venture between the farmers and two 
private marketing firms, including Yukon 
International and Swallow International, 
respectively United States and Swaziland-
based firms of buyers and exporters of 
vegetable commodities. The production of 
‘baby’ vegetables for the export market was 
identified as a possible niche for the small-
scale farmers. 
During the first year of baby vegetable 
production in 1999, the farmers attended 
a training course to develop skills in quality 
control and marketing. They also harvested 
and sold produce over a five month period 
from May to September. The initial attempt 
to export crops of high quality floundered 
because of the failure by the farmers to meet 
the international standards for exported 
perishables. Drawbacks included distance 
from airports and the unavailability of 
refrigerated transport, which led to spoilage 
of crops and the subsequent reduction of 
value. A key shortcoming, however, was 
the lack of a ‘pack house’ of acceptable 
international standards to prepare and 
package the produce under the required 
export processing conditions. This initial 
experience reinforced the perception that 
a pack house, located on the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme was necessary, primarily 
to serve its members but also other vegetable 
producers within the locality.
Working in collaboration with the 
National Department of Agriculture, Africare 
secured funding of R1.4 million to initiate 
the pack house project. The project was 
expected to generate and improve farm-based 
and non-farm based livelihoods, directly 
for 217 small-scale farmers and 61 people 
employed in the pack house and nursery, and 
indirectly for 2 500 people working within 
the production co-operative. At least half of 
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Greater Sekhukhune District’s more than 
10 000 farmers were envisaged as utilising 
the pack house. A further 50% of farmers 
was expected to see a large improvement in 
access to inputs (seedlings from the nursery), 
access to markets through improved post-
harvest handling (pack house), improved 
farm management skills (training) and access 
to market information and bulk sales (through 
co-operatives). 
Shift of the pack house 
The plans to locate the pack house within 
the Hereford Irrigation Scheme sparked 
off contestation between a number of 
stakeholders. The contestations appear to 
have been strongly linked to the emergence 
of the pack house project at a time when the 
idea of ‘developmental’ local government 
was beginning to be strongly embraced both 
nationally and in Greater Sekhukhune. In line 
with the requirements of the IDP process, the 
pack house project plans were tabled before 
the Greater Groblersdal local municipality. 
The project was to be included in the 
municipality’s LED plans. It was around 
this time that a decision was made to shift 
the location of the pack house away from 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme into the district 
arena. This entailed selecting a location 
from which the pack house could best serve 
the interests of not only farmers in the 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme and its immediate 
hinterland, but also of Greater Sekhukhune 
District as a whole. Selecting a site that 
would be politically acceptable to most 
stakeholders and at the same time logistically 
practical, in terms of the envisaged model 
of commercial production, proved to be a 
difficult and complex problem.1
Because the REAP included nine 
other irrigation communities, there were 
problems with locating the pack house, as 
originally planned, in the Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme. A decision-making process was 
set in motion in 2001 by the REAP Steering 
Committee, consisting of representatives 
from the Department of Agriculture, Tribal 
Councils and REAP Irrigation Projects, who 
made decisions about the local Africare 
Programme. The REAP Steering Committee 
decided that for practical purposes the pack 
house had to be located elsewhere in the 
district where it would be accessible to all 
small-scale irrigation farmers in Greater 
Sekhukhune. From the debate that emerged 
around the best possible location, the REAP 
Steering Committee established within 
itself a ‘Pack House Task Team’ to address 
the problem of location. Finally, in 2002, 
a decision was made to locate the pack house 
in Groblersdal.
A key issue for Africare was that the idea 
to build a pack house had emerged from a 
process of market development and that there 
was no available funding for its construction. 
A second key issue related to ‘ownership’ of 
the pack house. In attempting to address this 
second issue, the REAP Steering Committee 
and Africare decided to form the Sekhukhune 
Farmers’ Development Trust (SFDT), which 
would own and manage the pack house. In 
2001, the SFDT was registered as a trust 
organisation and a board of trustees was 
democratically constituted, with a female 
farmer as chairperson of the board. Official 
documentation2 states that the establishment 
of the SFDT was a response to emerging 
farmers in the Greater Sekhukhune District. 
A number of activities appear to 
have taken place in preparation for the 
construction of the pack house. The REAP 
Steering Committee visited similar initiatives 
elsewhere to observe how such projects were 
conceptualised. Calls for submissions of 
proposals for the design and construction of 
the pack house were published, and the tender 
selection process was concluded in February 
2003. Concurrent with these developments, 
the Greater Groblersdal local municipality 
took office and the new mayor promised to 
consider a request for municipal assistance in 
allocating a site for the pack house. However, 
this appears not to have happened, and the 
SFDT eventually purchased two plots of 
land in the industrial section of Groblersdal. 
Africare provided funding.
The local municipality responded to this 
acquisition of land by proffering funding for 
the construction of the pack house, through 
the Municipal Local Economic Development 
Fund. A MOU was then drafted between 
the Greater Groblersdal local municipality 
and the SFDT. The provisions of the MOU 
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were that the local municipality would have 
ownership of the project for three years, 
after which time the ownership would be 
transferred to the SFDT. The decisions and 
the MOU around the pack house project 
elicited extensive debate, contestation and 
power dynamics. It was at this point that the 
Greater Sekhukhune District Council appears 
to have joined the fray.
There was debate over the choice of 
Groblersdal as the site of the pack house, 
over the four other local municipalities in the 
Greater Sekhukhune District. The rationale 
given by the REAP Steering Committee 
and the SFDT for choosing Groblersdal was 
that the urban centre possesses the required 
infrastructure, services and human resources 
to support the pack house venture. Farmers 
in the Hereford Irrigation Scheme contested 
this. Their view was that the decision-
making process was corrupted by political 
expedience and the self-interest of certain 
individuals who stood to benefit from the 
project. There were also questions over 
the logistics of transporting produce over 
distances ranging from one to over a hundred 
kilometres, particularly without refrigerated 
transport. Factors underlying the debate 
included expectations of high incomes for 
farmers and allied sectors, farm and non-farm 
employment for local people, and the prestige 
associated with what was perceived to be a 
potentially high profile project.
Interviews with key respondents revealed 
the existence of power dynamics between 
the district municipality and the local 
municipality in the debate surrounding 
the pack house project. Apparently, 
members of the nodal delivery team of the 
district had taken the pack house proposal 
directly to the Provincial Department of 
Local Government and Housing, without 
consulting the Greater Groblersdal local 
municipality. The latter therefore considered 
that the district municipality had not acted 
according to proper procedure, and had 
in fact overlooked the role of the local 
municipality in making decisions about an 
issue within its jurisdiction. The views of 
Greater Sekhukhune’s nodal delivery team 
could not be obtained as all the officers in 
that team were no longer employed by the 
municipality. 
Other identified power dynamics were 
between the Greater Sekhukhune District 
mayor, who is also the political champion 
of the ISRDP, and the then-district 
municipal manager. Views were expressed 
that the pack house issue was one of the 
factors that contributed to the escalation 
of tension between the two, and to the 
ultimate departure of the latter. Attempts to 
gain further insights into this matter were 
unfruitful. Efforts to interview the mayor 
were repeatedly unsuccessful. However, an 
interview with the manager in the mayor’s 
office revealed that the district mayor had 
become involved in the matter largely 
because there was a realisation that the board 
of the SFDT was not representative of the 
interests of the district as a whole. 
A key respondent from the IDT, which 
played an advisory role to the Greater 
Sekhukhune nodal delivery team, had 
a contrasting view. This was that the 
involvement of the district municipality 
was justified by the need for a district 
level structure to facilitate the filtering of 
project funding from the NDA, through the 
Provincial Department of Local Government 
and Housing, ultimately to the Greater 
Groblersdal local municipality. 
Notwithstanding these explanations the 
farmers on the Hereford Irrigation Scheme 
perceive there to be various reasons for the 
change of location for the pack house. One 
perception is that their lack of secure tenure 
was a prime factor, while another is that 
some stakeholders within district and local 
municipalities acted out of self-interest. 
In contesting the decision to locate the 
pack house in Groblersdal, farmers in the 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme argue that the 
pack house was originally intended to benefit 
their group, who had participated in the initial 
experiment of producing baby vegetables 
for export. Statements of the new municipal 
manager for Greater Sekhukhune and the 
site manager for Africare corroborate this 
view. The Hereford small-scale farmers 
further point out that their surveys of 
similar projects and their assessment of the 
logistics of transporting their produce over 
the one to two kilometre distance show that 
it is not practical to locate the pack house 
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in Groblersdal. They also point out that, 
according to the requirements of international 
standards for perishable export crops, it is not 
hygienically desirable to locate a pack house 
in an industrial area, where pollutants might 
contaminate produce. 
In spite of the Hereford farmers’ 
arguments, the implementation of the pack 
house project went ahead. Construction of a 
pack house has begun in the industrial area of 
Groblersdal. 
Return of the Hereford pack 
house: A new lease on life
In 2003, a feeling of despondency over the 
‘lost’ pack house was observed amongst the 
small-scale farmers on the Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme. Questionnaire and interview data 
showed that the vegetable producers had 
resorted to marketing their produce in 
roadside stalls and to local small traders. 
The leadership of the Hereford Farmers’ 
Association stated that they would not utilise 
the pack house in Groblersdal on principle, as 
well as for practical reasons. Their objective 
was to continue to seek assistance for the 
construction of a pack house located within 
the scheme. 
The formal request for funding began with 
the Hereford Farmers’ Association applying 
for financial assistance through the Greater 
Groblersdal local municipality in December 
2003. The application appears to have had 
support from the district municipal office. 
According to the district municipal manager, 
the district-wide focus of the project had 
become impracticable for several reasons. 
These included the time and effort required 
to overcome the effect of distance on the 
transportation of perishable produce, shortage 
of irrigation water over much of the district, 
and the huge amount of funding required 
to make such a large number of small-
scale farmers competitive enough in the 
horticultural sector. 
The efforts of the Hereford Farmers’ 
Association appear to have paid off during 
2004, when the NDA approved a grant of 
approximately R550 000 for the construction 
of a pack house and tunnels on the communal 
plot. The grant was less than the R900 000 
requested by the HVGA. This is probably 
more realistic, given that not all farmers want 
to be part of this joint venture. 
This development appears to have given 
a new lease of life to the farmers, some 
who had joined the tobacco joint venture 
(described in Chapter 4 of this report) while 
others who had resolutely refused to grow 
tobacco for ethical reasons. The ‘return’ 
of the pack house also accounts for the 
decision by many farmers to abandon tobacco 
production following the failure of the 2004 
venture. 
Conclusion
The pack house project illustrates how the 
involvement of a multiplicity of stakeholders, 
including municipalities, in the governance 
of joint venture projects, such as the Hereford 
vegetable project, can impact upon the 
livelihood strategies of small-scale farmers. 
The pack house assumes an allegorical image 
through which farmers’ struggle to eke out 
sustainable livelihoods from the gains made 
through access to land and water are played 
out. Whereas the governance problems of the 
tobacco joint venture are largely contained 
within the parties to the venture, those of the 
earlier vegetable joint venture are largely 
driven by external influences. Following what 
they perceived to be the failure of the initial 
pack house project, the farmers decided to 
enter into an initial partnership with MKTV 
and later Tobacco RSA, regardless of advice 
not to do so. This indicates the level of 
farmers’ distrust of a broader governance 
system. By closing their ranks and engaging 
in an independent joint venture with MKTV 
and Tobacco RSA, the farmers effectively 
reclaimed the latitude to determine their 
livelihoods. However, the unintended failure 
of the tobacco project in 2004 seems to 
indicate the need for greater co-operation 
between farmers and other stakeholders, 
in order to minimise the risk of erosion of 
livelihoods. There is also a need to place 
farmers’ interests at the centre of such 
co-operation. 
The pack house project suggests 
that problems of accountability exist in 
municipalities. Often, governance practices 
tend to predispose elected councillors to 
pursue the interests of their constituencies. 
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Differences in degrees of power and 
influence, and vested interests among elected 
councillors can result in decisions that favour 
the interests of the more powerful actors. 
The power dynamic behind the decision 
to locate the pack house in Groblersdal is 
subject to debate. However, there seems to be 
consensus that the decision-making process 
initiated by the REAP Steering Committee 
in 2001 might have been influenced by 
dynamics within and between various spheres 
of governance, and particularly by high 
profile individuals within certain political and 
business circles.
Clearly the Hereford Irrigation Scheme 
has been the focal point of attention from 
a variety of stakeholders and observers, 
including roleplayers within government 
and political party structures ranging 
from the local to the national level, and 
possibly beyond. The designation of Greater 
Sekhukhune District as an ISRDP node places 
an additional imperative on government 
interventions to be seen as effective in 
addressing issues of poverty and inequality. 
International events, such as the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development, have 
also contributed to the increasing focus on the 
district (Tapela 2002a). Given the wide range 
of parties interested in the Hereford case, and 
variations in the local and national political 
and institutional milieu, it is not particularly 
clear to whom the local municipality has been 
accountable primarily. The ‘return’ of the 
pack house to the Hereford Irrigation Scheme 
strongly indicates that local decision making 
is responding to changes in the power arena. 
The degree to which these changes imply a 
significant shift to downward accountability, 
has yet to be seen.
Although the Hereford pack house project 
provides some evidence to the contrary, in 
my view, municipalities can play useful roles 
in pursuing the interests of local people and 
co-ordinating aspects of the facilitative and 
monitoring roles by other stakeholders. The 
degree to which municipalities can fulfil 
these roles depends on the extent to which 
they are downwardly accountable.
Endnotes
1. I encountered difficulties in unravelling 
the complexities of the process of pack 
house ‘capture’, with some respondents 
giving different versions of the process on 
each occasion they were interviewed, and 
others deliberately withholding information. 
Consequently, the approach I took was to 
triangulate all information and to request 
available documentation relating specifically 
to the project. Attempts to get information and 
documentation from the Greater Groblersdal 
local municipality were unsuccessful. 
Research revealed that the LED Manager 
for the local municipality had initially been 
one of the plot holders on the scheme, and 
had subsequently left the scheme under 
circumstances that were unclear to the 
researcher. This section of the report thus 
relies on information collected from other 
key stakeholders, including Africare, SFDT, 
Greater Sekhukhune District and the Hereford 
Farmers’ Association.
2.   SFDT Information Brochure. 
Chapter 5: Vegetable joint venture or ‘the “return” of the fugitive pack house’ 
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Support to emerging farmers by the various sectors derives from the core objectives of the Agricultural Sector 
Strategy (DLA 2001) namely, to:
• enhance equitable access and 
participation in the agricultural sector.
• improve global competitiveness and 
profitability.
• ensure sustainable resource management. 
• ensure food security.
The Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Framework for Agriculture 
(Agri BEE) addresses the first two objectives, 
and joint ventures are considered a key 
strategy for promoting entry by emerging 
irrigation farmers into the commercial 
sector. Strategic initiatives that complement 
Agri BEE include Irrigation Management 
Transfer, Water Allocation Reform, Policy 
on the Financial Assistance to Resource 
Poor Irrigation Farmers, Land Reform, 
the Comprehensive Agricultural Support 
Programme, municipal local economic 
development frameworks and the ISRDP. 
The Hereford case provides useful 
insights for the implementation of these 
complementary initiatives, which are often 
undertaken in a fragmented manner. 
Lessons deriving from the case study 
broadly relate to the challenges of creating 
a viable class of black commercial producers 
from the ranks of the dispossessed and 
previously disadvantaged. These challenges 
include strengthening governance and rights 
within joint ventures, farmers’ organisations 
and producer households; achieving 
institutional co-ordination; reducing the risks 
associated with capital-intensive crops such 
as tobacco; and sharing joint venture costs 
and benefits in a fair and equitable manner. 
A major challenge is the creation of real 
opportunities for emerging black farmers in 
the context of divergent social and neo-liberal 
policies and rural poverty and inequality. 
Joint venture risks, in the 
context of rural poverty and 
inequality
The Hereford case points to the fact that 
emerging producers within joint ventures, 
who are often resource poor and vulnerable, 
carry an inordinately high proportion of risk. 
They lack sufficient information on market 
trends and enjoy very little power to influence 
producer prices. By contrast, private investor 
partners have greater access to information 
on market trends, a stronger vested interest 
in the produce, and yet carry a relatively 
lower risk. This asymmetry reflects the 
larger structural inequalities that characterise 
much of South Africa’s rural economy. An 
example of small-scale farmers’ particular 
vulnerability to risks associated with the 
production of capital-intensive crops relates 
to the decision by Hereford farmers to grow 
tobacco, despite the fact that historically 
tobacco production has been unsuccessful 
in Hereford. There was a perception that 
the decline of Zimbabwe’s prime tobacco 
Chapter 6: Lessons from the 
Hereford case
This chapter considers some of the lessons that can be learned from the 
Hereford case study. It highlights the challenges of creating a viable class 
of black commercial producers from the ranks of the dispossessed and 
previously disadvantaged.
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production and exports to BAT–South Africa, 
following the orchestrated ‘fast-track’ land 
reform, constituted opportunities for entry 
into the tobacco sector by small-scale South 
African farmers. While the joint venture 
partners differ in their views on the emerging 
farmers’ skills and the quality of tobacco 
produced, perceptions on opportunities for 
market entry have been overshadowed by an 
increase in Brazil’s share of prime tobacco 
output. The recent nomination by BAT–PLC 
of Brazil, the United States and Zimbabwe as 
major sources of tobacco for the future1 raises 
further questions on the sustainability of joint 
ventures that promote crops such as tobacco 
as a means of empowering emerging farmers. 
The broader local context in which joint 
venture projects such as Hereford’s are 
undertaken is one that is not only designated 
by government as an ISRDP poverty node, 
but also one that is renowned as a cradle for 
rural resistance to apartheid. At the micro-
level, Hereford Irrigation Scheme is the site 
of historical and ongoing contestations over 
land, water and related resources between 
emerging black farmers and established white 
farmers. Various interests therefore converge 
on progress in agricultural ‘development’ in 
both the district and the scheme, including 
the interests of private sector investors. For 
these, Agri BEE provides an opportunity to 
demonstrate social responsibility by fostering 
entry by black commodity producers into 
the commercial sector, while partnerships 
with farmers such as those from Hereford 
broaden their access to productive land and 
water, as well as labour. The failure to date 
of joint ventures in the Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme and in similar projects in the Olifants 
Catchment Area suggests a need to review 
existing approaches. At a time when redress 
for past discrimination has become central 
to debates on the impacts of government 
interventions, it is imperative for joint 
ventures not to reverse the gains made by 
emerging black farmers. The failure of joint 
ventures in the Hereford Irrigation Scheme 
suggest a need for measures to reduce 
exposure of emerging farmers to the high 
risks associated with capital-intensive crops. 
Costs, benefits and power 
issues in joint ventures
Linked to the issue of risk is the question of 
mechanisms for sharing costs and benefits 
by joint venture partners. In the case of 
Hereford, private investors, farmers and 
government have all variously contributed 
to the production of tobacco, vegetables 
and other crops. On the one hand, private 
investors have made significant contributions, 
with BAT–SA providing a grant of R3 
million and Tobacco RSA providing 
technical and managerial services to the 
tobacco joint venture. While on the one 
hand BAT–SA’s capital input has assisted 
farmers by eliminating debt-related costs 
and risks, it has also raised questions around 
ownership and control of the crop. On the 
other hand, the government has made an 
even greater contribution, paying R7 million 
for the rehabilitation of the water storage 
dam on the scheme, R281 165 to settle 
arrears in emerging farmers’ water accounts 
and R550 000 towards the construction of 
greenhouses, among other expenses (see 
Table 5). Through the policy of the Financial 
Assistance to Resource Poor Irrigation 
Farmers the government will also fund 
a further R2.2 million required by emerging 
farmers towards lining the Hereford Canal. 
In addition, the government has made 
other non-monetary contributions in the 
form of extension services, mechanisation 
and, most important, land which will be 
transferred to the emerging farmers in terms 
of the Hereford LRAD project. Apart from 
contributing their labour and participating 
in decision making, the farmers have 
mostly been recipients of assistance from 
private investors and government. This will 
change with the cessation of subsidies and 
the introduction of ‘efficiency’ measures 
following the application of the water sector’s 
‘user-pays’ principle.
Despite their seemingly modest 
contribution, the farmers have nonetheless 
had significant freedom to make decisions 
around which private investors they enter 
into joint ventures with. While this indicates 
a relatively high degree of devolution of 
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decision making, it has highlighted problems 
relating to the capacity of the farmers’ 
to negotiate the terms and conditions of 
joint venture arrangements. The absence 
of a written contract for the tobacco joint 
venture and the inflated projections of the 
new vegetable joint venture’s business 
plans are cases in point. In the Hereford 
case, devolution of decision making has not 
translated into significant power within joint 
ventures. There is a need to clarify issues 
around ownership and control of produce 
and for joint venture partners to agree on 
principles of communication, transparency 
and accountability. 
In view of the financial and non-monetary 
contributions by government, and in light 
of the core objectives of the Agricultural 
Sector Strategy, the National Water Act, the 
Land Reform Policy and the ISRDP, it is 
imperative that policy practitioners provide 
structured and co-ordinated support to 
farmers entering into joint ventures. Some of 
the questions to be addressed are: 
• Given the propensity of private investor 
partners to exercise strength on the basis 
of their contributions to the joint venture, 
to what extent can the contributions by 
government be regarded as leverage for 
the emerging farmers? 
• What mechanisms can be used to ensure 
a fairer distribution of joint venture costs 
and benefits between producers and 
private investors? 
Gender issues
The various sectors involved in promoting 
emerging irrigation farmers appear to 
recognise the need for gender equity. 
Provisions for gender equity are made 
in the Financing Mechanisms for the 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support 
Programme, BAT–South Africa’s broad 
based BEE framework and the policy on 
the Financial Assistance to Resource Poor 
Irrigation Farmers, administered by DWAF. 
The latter goes a step further by basing 
levels of financial grants on the proportion 
of historically disadvantaged females within 
decision-making structures of farmers’ 
legal entities. However, such frameworks 
need to go beyond issues of gender equity 
by mainstreaming gender and generating 
gender perspectives. Although frameworks 
for institutional support to emerging 
irrigation farmers include training of farmers’ 
organisations, often the content pertaining to 
gender issues is not stated in explicit terms in 
such training programmes. 
Observations that gender power dynamics 
in irrigation schemes are often problematic 
(Van Koppen 2001; Bastidas 1999; 
Zwarteveen 1997; Zwarteveen & Neupane 
1996) suggest the need for clearly stated 
and funded programmes of action around 
awareness creation, adoption and promotion 
of gender-sensitive principles. 
Institutional co-ordination and 
monitoring
While the Hereford case shows that there has 
been a degree of integration across spheres 
and sectors of government, and between 
government, civil society and the private 
sector, the support provided by a multiplicity 
of stakeholders to emerging farmers has 
often been fragmented, and co-ordination 
and monitoring has been lacking. The 
‘Systems Act’ establishes municipalities as 
developmental local authorities and accords 
them the legal responsibility to promote, 
undertake and co-ordinate all development 
planning and budgeting, facilitate compliance 
with the principles of co-operative 
government and intergovernmental relations, 
and monitor the impact and effectiveness of 
any services, policies, programmes or plans 
within their areas of jurisdiction. However, 
the earlier Hereford vegetable project 
suggests the limited capacity of the Greater 
Sekhukhune District municipality to play an 
effective co-ordination and monitoring role. 
In the case of Greater Groblersdal local 
municipality, the LED Committee for 
Agriculture constitutes the relevant structure 
for dealing with cases such as joint ventures 
in the Hereford Irrigation Scheme. This 
structure brings together large- and small-
scale commercial farmers, communal farmers 
and relevant locally-based government 
departments, NGOs and the agri-business 
sector. However, the Groblersdal LED 
Committee for Agriculture has virtually 
collapsed owing to the lack of an LED 
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plan for the municipal IDP and a broadly 
perceived lack of leadership and support 
within the municipality. 
More recently, however, there have been 
moves towards improved co-ordination. At 
provincial and regional levels, the promotion 
of entry into commercial production 
by emerging farmers is driven by the 
Mpumalanga Co-ordinating Committee for 
Agricultural Water (CCAW). This structure 
brings together actors from the environmental 
cluster, namely the water, agriculture, 
land and environmental departments. The 
Mpumalanga CCAW provides a key link 
between the national and the local spheres 
of government. It is through this structure 
that the Hereford Farmers’ Association, 
and indeed the Hereford Irrigation Board, 
submitted applications in August and 
September 2004 for government subsidies 
for improved access to water. The application 
by the former has been lodged in terms of 
the new Policy on Financial Assistance to 
Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers, adopted 
in September 2004. The general view of 
some actors within the CCAW is that the 
application by the small-scale farmers 
will receive approval because of their 
classification as ‘resource-poor irrigation 
farmers’ and also because of the grounding 
of land rights on the scheme in the LRAD 
programme. 
A more effective structure to deal with 
agricultural issues within the local authority 
is required. Challenges of achieving 
integration between local authorities and 
water-related institutions tend to persist 
after various sector reforms have been 
implemented, often with negative impacts 
on local people’s livelihoods and wellbeing 
(Tapela 2002b). There is, as yet, no clear link 
between the activities of the CCAW, which 
is informed by Integrated Water Resources 
Management approaches, and those of 
local authorities, which are responsible for 
integrated development planning within 
the ISRDP nodal district. In the past, the 
local municipality’s LED Committee for 
Agriculture interacted indirectly with the 
CCAW through representation by provincial 
and national government officials, however 
it has since collapsed. There is a need for 
mechanisms to ensure that a greater degree of 
integration between water management and 
local developmental structures is achieved. 
Without such integration, the interests of 
small-scale irrigation farmers are likely to 
remain marginal to developmental processes. 
Drawing from the developmental logic 
of decentralisation (Ribot 2002), if local 
authorities are sufficiently downwardly 
accountable, it can be reasonably assumed 
that such interaction would contribute to 
ensuring that the interests of small-scale 
farmers remain central to efforts to promote 
an emergent class of petty commodity 
producers. 
In addition to the need for improved 
co-ordination, joint venture settings such 
as those in Hereford require effective 
monitoring mechanisms. The farmers 
are poised to own their land, yet require 
substantial government assistance. Various 
government programmes and structures 
have been put in place to promote emerging 
farmers. Yet because this assistance is 
insufficient, private investors offer additional 
resources to promote black economic 
empowerment in agriculture, while expecting 
profits. This milieu is influenced by political 
and business interests. The complexities 
of having a multiplicity of stakeholders 
are compounded by autonomous decision 
making by individual and collective emerging 
farmers. There is a strong need to define who 
is accountable to whom, and who plays the 
monitoring role. Municipalities often lack 
the resources to perform monitoring roles. 
Policy makers need to find ways of ensuring 
that joint ventures involving resource-poor 
irrigation farmers are effectively monitored, 
not only for economic viability, but for 
compliance with BEE objectives and for 
maximum impact on people’s livelihoods. 
Given that farming activities are an 
extension of the broader basket of livelihood 
strategies for farmer and farm worker 
households, evaluations should recognise 
this linkage. Criteria for monitoring 
and evaluating the performance of the 
beneficiaries of government assistance 
should accommodate both commercial and 
subsistence farming objectives. With specific 
regard to irrigation schemes assisted through 
the LRAD programme, straddling can result 
in the invisibility of those household and 
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broader community members living outside 
irrigation schemes. The impacts of projects 
on these people might be overlooked in 
evaluations of the performance and impacts 
of projects. The evaluation criteria should 
therefore also include indicators such as 
the number of people, for example farmers’ 
households and broader communities, 
benefiting from the schemes. 
 
Conclusion
Given significant government expenditure 
on promoting farmers’ livelihoods, the need 
for effective co-ordination and monitoring of 
joint ventures cannot be overstated. However, 
what seems more critical is the need to 
examine the basis of government intervention 
on a hybrid of neo-liberal development 
approaches and social welfare or anti-poverty 
approaches. In the context of the prevailing 
commoditisation of productive water and 
land resources, and the recurrent failure of 
joint ventures, government subsidies might 
not be sufficient to secure the livelihoods of 
emerging farmers. Although the government 
has made moves to address the financial 
requirements of emerging farmers, there is 
still a need for a broader range of support 
services, including the development of 
skills that strengthen farmer organisations 
to enable them to deal with both internal 
and external power issues. Such skills will 
contribute to the effectiveness of existing 
efforts to develop production, processing and 
marketing skills. 
The Hereford case epitomises South 
Africa’s challenge of addressing rural 
poverty and inequality through co-ordinated 
strategies involving government, civil society 
and the private sector, in partnership with 
local people. Joint ventures in the irrigation 
scheme articulate the government-driven 
Agri BEE. The location of the joint venture 
projects within a designated ISRDP poverty 
node that is renowned as a cradle for rural 
resistance to apartheid, and the historical and 
ongoing contestations over land, water and 
related resources between emerging black 
farmers and established white farmers in 
the Hereford area, place a strong imperative 
on policy makers to ensure that appropriate 
mechanisms are adopted to address the 
problems associated with joint ventures. 
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